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BRANDON L. GARRETT

ABSTRACT
Constitutional rulings risk an unnoticed type of mission creep: misplacement
through adoption in settings that they were not designed to regulate. This Article
describes how in a set of important areas—and sometimes despite the Supreme
Court’s explicit cautionary language—constitutional rules have taken hold
outside of the settings that they were primarily designed to regulate, providing
unanticipated additions to rules and practice. Constitutional rights and
standards are often context limited to particular government actors, procedural
settings, or remedies. Based on the text of the Constitution or precedent, some
rights apply only during civil cases, while others apply only during criminal
cases; some regulate executive actors, while others exclusively relate to judicial
officers. Misplacement can occur if, for example, a right that regulates evidence
at criminal trials is extended, without support, to regulate executive officers.
This type of misplacement has occurred in areas including eyewitness evidence,
civil punitive damages, and the Miranda warnings. In addition, executive actors,
ranging from administrative agencies to local police, may incorporate into their
decision-making constitutional rules not intended to provide guidance in such
settings. In doing so, actors may overprotect or, far more troubling,
underprotect constitutional rights in unintended ways. It can be quite valuable
to borrow from constitutional law, including to safeguard rights and harmonize
nonconstitutional law with constitutional standards. However, doing so requires
far more careful decision-making beginning with clearer judicial guidance on
where and to whom constitutional rights should attach. The problem of
misplaced constitutional rights should be addressed far more carefully by judges
and government actors.
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INTRODUCTION
Constitutional rulings are not just declared by the Supreme Court and then
applied in a rote fashion by lower courts. Constitutional rights must be
interpreted and implemented by varied government actors, and they may
influence various branches of government and public opinion. When
constitutional rights are intended to regulate government actors, complex
questions may arise with regard to the implementation of those rights in areas
including criminal procedure, all the way from the initial investigations to
assertions of rights as defenses in criminal cases; civil damages awards; and
actions seeking injunctive relief against government agencies or officials.1 In
this Article, I develop a set of shadow consequences in which actors use
constitutional rights intended to inform rules and practice in one setting in a
different and unauthorized setting instead. Those constitutional standards are
thus misplaced.
Constitutional text or interpretation can limit the reach of a constitutional right
to a particular actor, procedural context, or remedy.2 Some rights govern federal
and not state actors.3 Some rights provide a remedy in civil cases seeking
damages but not during criminal trials, or vice versa.4 If an executive, judicial,
or legislative actor applies a constitutional right or standard to (1) the wrong
government actor, (2) the wrong procedural setting, or (3) the wrong remedy,
constitutional law can be—as I call it in this Article for lack of an existing term
for the phenomenon—misplaced. To be sure, in many areas, government actors
can choose to provide greater protection than the Constitution demands; the
Constitution typically provides a floor, not a ceiling.5 In still other areas, the
1

This Article builds on an earlier piece that develops what rules should govern the
intersection of constitutional and evidence law. See generally Brandon L. Garrett,
Constitutional Law and the Law of Evidence, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 57 (2015). There, I argue
that the intersection is undertheorized and that courts require clearer rules for resolving
conflicts. Id. at 59. I further argue that sound protection of constitutional interests may be far
more compatible with evidence law rules than often supposed but only if there is careful
engagement with the potential impact of the constitutional rule on evidence practice. Id. at
87-98. For an exploration of the “creep,” or the influence of constitutional amendment
provisions on interpretation of substantive rights—an interesting but different, structural
question—see generally Jonathan L. Marshfield, Amendment Creep, 115 MICH. L. REV. 215
(2016).
2 For a description of how constitutional rights can be developed through decision rules
that spell out obligations for particular government actors, see generally, for example,
Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004).
3 For examples, see infra Section I.A.
4 For examples, see infra Section I.B.
5 See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 495, 503 (1977) (“[M]ore and more state courts are construing
state constitutional counterparts of provisions of the Bill of Rights as guaranteeing citizens of
their states even more protection than the federal provisions . . . .”); William F. Swindler,
Minimum Standards of Constitutional Justice: Federal Floor and State Ceiling, 49 MO. L.
REV. 1, 7-11 (1984) (discussing Missouri’s and Virginia’s changes to their state constitutions
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Supreme Court may not have clearly articulated to which actors or procedural
settings a right may be applicable or what remedies may be available for
violations of the right. In such instances there is no misplacement, as described
here, if such placement options remain undefined or open.
When an application of a constitutional right does occur in clear contravention
of text or precedent, then such misplacement can under- and overprotect
constitutional rights in important ways that have not been adequately
understood. One example of a misplaced constitutional standard—an unintended
use of a constitutional rule in an evidentiary context—occurs with the Miranda
v. Arizona6 requirement that police provide a suspect the well-known set of
admonitions before proceeding with a custodial interrogation.7 Those warnings,
which now stand on a firmer constitutional foundation,8 were never designed to
guide jurors in assessing the value of confession evidence at a criminal trial but
rather were designed to deter abusive questioning tactics.9 And yet, as I describe
in this Article, some state courts include in their standard form jury instructions
a statement that jurors should consider whether Miranda warnings were given;10
if Miranda was violated, then the evidence should not come in at trial. This jury
instruction does not serve a protective role. Instead, it may underprotect the right
by suggesting to jurors that, by having waived Miranda rights, a defendant’s
confession might be per se voluntary.
A similar example can be found regarding the Supreme Court’s due process
decision in Manson v. Brathwaite,11 which requires that a judge suppress unduly
suggestive and unreliable eyewitness evidence.12 The rule was designed to

in light of federal constitutional interpretations).
6 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
7 Id. at 478-79 (“[W]hen an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, . . . [h]e
must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything
he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an
attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires.”).
8 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000) (affirming constitutional nature of
Miranda ruling).
9 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445-58 (describing nature of interrogation tactics used by law
enforcement and stating that “[u]nless a proper limitation upon custodial interrogation is
achieved—such as these decisions will advance—there can be no assurance that practices of
this nature will be eradicated in the foreseeable future”).
10 See infra Section I.C. For a larger overview of state law standards in the area and how
state courts have moved away from the constitutional floor, see Thomas D. Albright &
Brandon L. Garrett, The Law and Science of Eyewitness Evidence 70 (Aug. 3, 2020)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3675055
[https://perma.cc/23AB-XLUC].
11 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
12 Id. at 114.

2020]

MISPLACED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

2089

render some identification evidence inadmissible,13 not to instruct a jury on how
to weigh admissible eyewitness evidence. Yet, as I will describe, many state
courts that provide instructions regarding eyewitness evidence have
incorporated the Manson due process test into their model jury instructions.14 In
important ways, these jury instructions may mislead jurors regarding the factors
that make an eyewitness identification more or less reliable. This conclusion is
informed by a large body of scientific research conducted in the decades since
the Manson ruling.15 Not only should the constitutional standard not be used to
advise jurors—it was never intended to be used in the courtroom in that
fashion—but this use of the constitutional standard is also increasingly out of
date.16
In a set of important and unrelated areas, and sometimes despite the Supreme
Court’s cautionary language, constitutional rules have taken hold outside of the
settings that they were primarily designed to regulate, providing unanticipated
additions to evidence rules and practice and more. Perhaps most troubling are
the judicial decisions that profess not to alter other bodies of law but that have
had that very effect. Rulings by the Court that were designed to elaborate the
underlying constitutional right have done more; they have become part of the
instructions given to a jury when weighing evidence in a case, have affected
rules for admissibility of expert evidence, and have affected prosecution
decisions, among other things. Extending constitutional rulings in this manner
may actually erode rights. The Court may have carefully limited a right due to a
concern with one remedy, such as an exclusion remedy at trial, without intending
to foreclose another remedy, such as damages. Extending the limited form of the
right may incorrectly close off all constitutional remedies altogether.
This problem of overextension of constitutional standards in new contexts
could not be more prominent than in the area of police use of force. In highprofile cases, prosecutors decide whether to charge officers who use deadly
force.17 In this context, civil constitutional standards have influenced
prosecutors deciding whether to criminally charge police for using deadly force.
To take one high-profile example, after former Cleveland police officer Timothy
Loehmann shot and killed Tamir Rice, Timothy McGinty, the Cuyahoga County

13

Id. (“We therefore conclude that reliability is the linchpin in determining the
admissibility of identification testimony . . . .” (emphasis added)).
14 See infra Section II.C.
15 See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT: ASSESSING
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION (2014) [hereinafter NRC REPORT] (summarizing research on
eyewitness memory and criticizing Manson factors as not supported by that scientific
research). I note that I served on the committee that produced that report.
16 See id. at 31-44 (summarizing developments in state statutes and judicial rulings). For a
longer exploration of these changes, see Garrett & Albright, supra note 10, at 30-61.
17 See Cynthia Lee, Reforming the Law on Police Use of Deadly Force: De-Escalation,
Preseizure Conduct, and Imperfect Self-Defense, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 629, 633 (“This country
has seen an increase in the number of officer-involved homicide prosecutions over the last
several years.”).
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prosecutor, concluded that his office should not present charges to a grand jury.18
In presenting that conclusion to the public in a detailed report, McGinty cited
Fourth Amendment rulings in civil, not criminal, cases.19 McGinty likely felt
more secure citing to the authority of federal constitutional rulings despite
making a decision whether to prosecute for a state law crime. While not legally
wrong—it was an exercise of discretion and the prosecutor could have offered
no justification at all—the use of a misplaced constitutional standard raises a
different set of questions in that context. An important and unexplored question
remains regarding the use of constitutional rights as justification.
Constitutional rights may go perversely underenforced through the extension
of constitutional rulings to settings that they were not designed to apply to.20 I
argue that far more attention is owed to this problem of misplaced constitutional
language in the murky and poorly understood operation of rules on the ground,
at trials, and in still less clearly defined decision-making by executive officials.
I suggest how courts can address the problem and how higher courts can
intervene if lower courts do not. I also describe how executive actors and
lawmakers can rethink constitutional floors and ceilings.
This set of problems is a subset of a larger problem of constitutional drift.
Frederick Schauer has pointed out that, “[i]n interpretive arenas below the
Supreme Court, one good quote [from the Supreme Court] is worth a hundred
clever analyses of the holding.”21 Casual phrases and entire doctrines can serve
purposes entirely unintended from, and even at odds with, their origins. Supreme
Court rulings and language from holdings can migrate into other rulings and
contexts. In other contexts, the primary concern is with politically unaccountable
judges rendering rulings that constrain democracy.22 What is novel about the
problem of misplaced rights, however, is that while constitutional law can and
often does inform government actors in productive ways that can safeguard
against the erosion of constitutional rights in litigation, misplacement of
constitutional standards can do the opposite.23 While we are familiar with
18 TIMOTHY J. MCGINTY, CUYAHOGA COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S REPORT ON THE NOVEMBER
22, 2014 SHOOTING DEATH OF TAMIR RICE 70 (2015) [hereinafter CUYAHOGA REPORT],
http://prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us/pdf_prosecutor/en-US/Rice%20Case%20Report
%20FINAL%20FINAL%2012-28a.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Y5V-HHAR].
19 Id. at 39, 70 (discussing Fourth Amendment case law concerning whether officers’
actions were reasonable and whether officers should receive qualified immunity).
20 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 54, 149-52 (1997) (“On the whole, the Court’s selection of tests has produced doctrines
that tend more to underprotect than to overprotect constitutional norms.”); Kermit Roosevelt
III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV.
1649, 1667-86 (2005); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213-20 (1978).
21 Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 682, 683 (1986) (book
review).
22 See Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the
Norms and Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959, 959 (1985).
23
See generally, e.g., Garrett, supra note 1 (describing the consequences of constitutional
law being imported into the evidentiary context).
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constitutional prophylactic rules aimed at protecting rights, there is scarce
literature about the opposite: misplaced use of constitutional standards that can
erode rights.
In this Article, I conclude that far more care is warranted where constitutional
standards were not intended to create constitutional law. That lower courts,
executive actors, and others may build on the constitutional floor and incorporate
constitutional norms into their decision-making is unremarkable. That actors
may instead adopt uses contrary to the substance of constitutional law, however,
suggests that far more attention should be paid to how rights are administered in
practice.
I.

PLACEMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

Constitutional rights, based on both the text of the Constitution and the
development of standards to interpret those rights, may apply to particular
government actors, stages of proceedings, or types of proceedings, and they may
call for specific remedies. First, this Part describes how constitutional rights can
sometimes apply to particular government actors: some to federal actors; some
to state and local actors; and some primarily to executive, judicial, or legislative
officers. Second, constitutional rights may apply to all or just portions of a
proceeding—such as providing remedies pretrial versus during a trial—while
other rights apply at any stage or are not determinate. Third, rights may provide
only particular remedies based on text, interpretation, or the implementation of
statutes. In each of the following Sections, I provide brief examples of how each
of these three ways in which constitutional rights may be defined and placed
relate to the problem of subsequent misplacement.
A.

Rights Attached to Government Actors

Constitutional rights based on text or precedent do not always apply to all
possible actors or remedies available against those actors. Often, the Supreme
Court has held that a constitutional doctrine or standard provides a remedy for
its violation only in a particular context. Sometimes, constitutional text makes
clear to which government actor its strictures and resulting remedies are
addressed.24 For example, not all constitutional rights apply to state as opposed
to federal actors.25 Some constitutional rights, as a matter of text, apply to
criminal procedure and not to civil actions.26 Some constitutional rights are
exclusively directed at executive actors and not at judicial actors.27 Some are
24

See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82
YALE L.J. 1363, 1384 (1973) (discussing how mootness doctrine is aimed at federal judiciary
in its entirety).
25 Id.
26 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself . . . .” (emphasis added)).
27 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004); United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (holding that “unlawful search or seizure itself” violates the Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures and that judicial “use of fruits
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directed at Congress.28 Others still, such as the Thirteenth and Twenty-First
Amendments, are arguably also directed at private actors.29
Many rights, however, do not make clear which actors they are addressed to
and anticipate a judicial role in their enforcement. For example, some rights, like
those created by the Fourth Amendment, are directed first at executive actors
with the expectation that judicial officers then enforce them in litigation.30 Other
rights, like those created the Due Process Clauses,31 have extremely broad
language capable of being applied in civil and criminal cases against both state
and federal executive, legislative, and judicial officers. Sometimes, the Supreme
Court has extended constitutional text to reach additional actors—for example,
incorporating most provisions of the Bill of Rights as against states through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.32 In so doing, the Court
required states to adopt constitutional floors to minimally comply with the
Constitution. However, the Court typically does not impose constitutional
ceilings. That is, states are free to exceed the strictures of the Constitution and
provide greater remedies and protections. Although the Court has sometimes
restricted Congress’s ability to impose greater strictures on states than the
Constitution provides,33 state and local actors can exceed the Constitution to
impose additional protections.
To be sure, even if a constitutional right clearly applies—based on text and
precedent—to a government actor, there may be difficult questions about
whether a plaintiff has standing to assert a constitutional right, depending on

of a past unlawful search or seizure ‘work[s] no new Fourth Amendment wrong” (alteration
in original) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 (1974))).
28 For example, certain Article I provisions, such as the Commerce Clause, may be asserted
as a jurisdictional defense in litigation. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Other Article I
provisions directly limit Congress’s authority and can be asserted affirmatively or as a defense
if violative legislation was enforced. See id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post
facto Law shall be passed.”).
29 See id. amend. XXI, § 2 (“The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or
possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation
of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”); id. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction.”).
30 Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209,
1240 (2010) (“The Fourth Amendment is written in the passive voice, so it does not specify
who may violate it. But text and structure strongly suggest that the Fourth Amendment is
concerned with executive and judicial actions rather than legislative actions.” (emphasis
added)).
31 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
32 See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
is applicable to states through Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
33 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding that congressional
expansion of First Amendment freedoms via Religious Freedom Restoration Act exceeded
Congress’s enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment).
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their injury and the government actor being sued.34 A constitutional right might
not be legally cognizable if asserted by a particular type of plaintiff given a lack
of a sufficiently concrete injury. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
sometimes, for federalism reasons, restricted the claims available to plaintiffs
and the remedies that courts can award against state and local actors for
constitutional violations.35
An area in which some observers view the Court as having itself misplaced a
right is the sovereign immunity doctrine. The Eleventh Amendment clearly
applies, based on its text, to cases in which a citizen of one state sues another
state.36 However, beginning in Hans v. Louisiana,37 and more recently in cases
like Alden v. Maine,38 the Court has extended that rule of immunity to cases in
which a citizen sues the state of the person’s citizenship in both federal and state
court—based not just on the text of the Eleventh Amendment but also on the
Tenth Amendment, unwritten structural federalism principles, and principles of
political accountability.39 The Court had already sharply limited the ability of
Congress to abrogate that immunity in Seminole Tribe v. Florida.40 Thus, the
Court extended the right to different actors being sued in different courts and
ruled that Congress could not undo those extensions of the doctrine by statute.
This area is arguably full of misplacement.41 However, in this Article, I focus
not on whether the Supreme Court has correctly placed a right but whether lower
courts, lawmakers, and executive actors follow the Court’s rulings regarding
placement of rights.

34 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (finding that federal
court lacked jurisdiction to issue injunctions against state actors when plaintiff’s asserted
injury was conjectural).
35 See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377-78 (1976) (relying on “important
considerations of federalism” in declining to recognize a “right to mandatory equitable relief
in some form when those in supervisory positions do not institute steps to reduce the incidence
of unconstitutional police misconduct”).
36 U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”); see also
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (“[T]he text of the Amendment would
appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts . . . .”).
37 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
38 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
39 See id. at 712; Hans, 134 U.S. at 15-18.
40 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47 (“We hold that notwithstanding Congress’ clear intent
to abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity, the Indian Commerce Clause does not grant
Congress that power, and therefore § 2710(d)(7) cannot grant jurisdiction over a State that
does not consent to be sued.”).
41 As William Marshall and Jason Cowart have put it: “State immunity jurisprudence is
not generally known for its great legal craftsmanship.” William P. Marshall & Jason S.
Cowart, State Immunity, Political Accountability, and Alden v. Maine, 75 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1069, 1088 (2000).
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A constitutional right can be misplaced if a suit is allowed against the wrong
government actor. For example, a federal court cannot permit a suit against an
individual prosecutor based on criminal procedure violations at a trial; the
Supreme Court has found that such prosecutorial misconduct is protected by
absolute immunity.42 The only avenues available to victims of such violations
are a challenge to the conviction on appeal, a post-conviction challenge, or a
civil suit against law enforcement. Conversely, states could misplace this
constitutional rule by citing the absolute immunity defense in a federal suit
against a prosecutor pursuant to a state regulation. In doing so, states would be
wrong to cite to this rule to foreclose state remedies, which may build upon the
constitutional floor. A state court citing to the federal doctrine of absolute
immunity—a doctrine based on an interpretation of a federal statute43—would
be relying on a misplaced interpretation of a federal cause of action for
constitutional litigation. If the state court cited to the federal doctrine purely as
informative or as an example of a leading approach, that would not be
problematic, although reasonable people could disagree whether federal law is
informative on that point. However, if the state court cites to federal doctrine as
authoritative, that would be an error.
In general, federal constitutional limitations do not apply to private actors
under the state action doctrine. Nevertheless, good arguments exist that private
institutions should adopt constitutional norms and protections, and statutes may
require them to do so. In so doing, constitutional rights or norms are not
necessarily misplaced.
B.

Rights Attached to Procedural Settings

Constitutional rights can attach to particular procedural settings. Rights may
apply to all or just portions of a proceeding—for example, by providing
remedies pretrial or instead during a trial—while other rights apply at any stage
or are indeterminate. Thus, jury trial rights based on text extend to trial
proceedings but not to other types of nontrial hearings or investigations. The
Sixth Amendment applies “[i]n all criminal prosecutions,”44 and therefore its
provisions, such as the right to counsel, apply in criminal cases but not in
administrative or other types of hearings.45 That text has been interpreted not to
apply to all phases of a criminal investigation but rather only to “critical” stages
at which substantial rights of the accused may be at stake.46 In contrast, other
rights apply during police investigations, such as Fourth Amendment rights.47
The Supreme Court has also elaborated constitutional standards that govern
42 See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 54 (2011) (finding that prosecutor’s office
could not be held liable for failure to train prosecutors “based on a single Brady violation”).
43 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).
44 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
45 Thus, the right to representation at civil commitment hearings is a due process right and
not a Sixth Amendment right. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494-97 (1980).
46 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972).
47 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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criminal procedure at trials. For example, the Ex Post Facto Clause applies to
criminal cases and not civil cases, as the Court has made clear.48
Yet sometimes the Supreme Court has interpreted the same amendment—and
even the same clause of the same amendment—to have different civil and
criminal applications. For example, Fourth Amendment protections against the
unreasonable use of force may create civil remedies but do not impact criminal
trials.49 Fourth Amendment search and seizure rules may create both civil
remedies50 and exclusionary remedies during criminal trials,51 but the Court has
held that they do not apply during grand jury proceedings.52 The Court has held
that Fourth Amendment rights cannot be raised in federal post-conviction
litigation, but they can be raised during trial or on appeal.53 The Court has also
held that a range of constitutional criminal procedure rights that call into
question the validity of a conviction can be raised in a civil case but only after a
conviction has been reversed.54 Moreover, the Court has repeatedly stepped in
to police these boundaries of rights guaranteed in civil, criminal, and postconviction litigation.55
Thus, constitutional rights may also apply during more than one stage, such
as during both investigations and trials. An example of the Supreme Court
extending a right to executive officers—specifically, at a preliminary stage—is
the well-known prophylactic Miranda right, or what Henry Monaghan has called
“constitutional common law.”56 The Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination is a trial right but has been interpreted to include a privilege that
may be asserted during investigations. The goal of Miranda was to provide
additional guidance to police officers who question individuals, sometimes
unrepresented by counsel, before any court proceeding at which a person might
assert Fifth Amendment privilege before a judge.57 By “[r]equiring Miranda
warnings before custodial interrogation,” the Supreme Court has explained, it
48

Ky. Union Co. v. Kentucky, 219 U.S. 140, 153 (1911).
See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388-89 (1989).
50 See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
51 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
52 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 342, 354-55 (1974).
53 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976) (denying habeas corpus relief to prisoners
despite finding that evidence used to convict them was seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment because state process provided them the opportunity for “full and fair litigation”
of Fourth Amendment claims).
54 See, e.g., Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).
55 For a description of the Court’s efforts to police boundaries between civil and postconviction litigation, see Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal
Wrongful Conviction Law, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 35, 53-55.
56 Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1975); accord Berman, supra note 2; David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules,
55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190 (1988).
57 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1966) (“We granted certiorari in these
cases . . . to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts
to follow.”).
49
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sought to “provide[] ‘practical reinforcement’ for the Fifth Amendment right.”58
The rule applies to law enforcement and is aimed at reinforcing police
compliance with the Fifth Amendment. The right is also to be enforced in court;
after all, if police violate the requirement, then there are exclusionary
consequences at a criminal trial.59 As such, the right first attaches at a
preliminary stage, before police questioning begins, and can then be asserted in
court.
These detailed specifications can result in misplaced constitutional rights if a
court applies the standard to a stage of proceedings to which the text or precedent
had not previously applied it. Thus, if a judicial or executive officer applies the
Sixth Amendment right to a criminal jury trial to a purely administrative trial or
applies the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in a criminal trial to a civil matter,
such actions would go beyond the constitutional text and beyond precedent.
While a state can choose to exceed the constitutional floor, it would be incorrect
to cite to the Sixth Amendment as a binding source. Similarly, based on rulings
like Heck v. Humphrey,60 it would be incorrect to allow a person to sue in federal
court for civil damages to remedy an alleged violation of a criminal procedure
right that implicates the validity of the conviction before the conviction itself
has been reversed.61
Conversely, it would be misplaced to cite to federal constitutional law as
regulating a stage during which federal courts themselves do not apply the right
or provide a remedy. While that federal constitutional law may be informative,
it also may not be if the federal rule was designed to regulate a different type of
proceeding. For example, the scope of the right to counsel at a criminal trial
might not be informative in a civil matter. As such, it would be misplaced to cite
to the Heck rule to bar a civil case once a conviction has in fact been properly
reversed, since the rule’s rationale was to prevent an end run around criminal
appeals and post-conviction litigation.
A counterexample illustrates how the Supreme Court is very much capable of
addressing faulty repurposing of constitutional rights when an abuse catches the
Justices’ attention. In Crane v. Kentucky,62 the state court had refused to let the
defendant introduce the circumstances of a confession at trial, including that the
defendant, when interrogated, had made statements inconsistent with the crime
scene evidence.63 The state court apparently reasoned that this effort to cast into
question the credibility of the confession was not proper because, as the
prosecutor contended, the judge had already ruled before trial that, as a “legal

58 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.
433, 444 (1974)).
59 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478 (discussing admissibility of statements obtained through
interrogation).
60 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
61 Id. at 487-88.
62 476 U.S. 683 (1986).
63 Id. at 685-86.
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matter,” the confession was voluntary under the Constitution.64 The Court
addressed the issue head-on, ruling that such a view of the role of a constitutional
voluntariness analysis “is premised on a misconception about the role of
confessions in a criminal trial.”65 As the Court stated, in “laying down” due
process rules regulating the voluntariness of confessions, a judge’s “pretrial
voluntariness determination does not undercut the defendant’s traditional
prerogative to challenge the confession’s reliability during the course of the
trial.”66 The exclusion of the evidence surrounding the circumstances of the
confession itself “deprived petitioner of his fundamental constitutional right to
a fair opportunity to present a defense.”67
C.

Rights Attached to Remedies

Constitutional rights can provide remedies specific to the right, due to text or
judicial interpretation of the right.68 Sometimes the Supreme Court develops a
standard to apply during a particular stage of litigation. For example, while the
Due Process Clause regulates civil and criminal proceedings, the Court has
elaborated applications of the clause specific to criminal trials.69 In other
situations, the Court has decided that a standard for a constitutional remedy in
one area is useful in another. If so, there can be a convergence of common
constitutional standards.70 Similar rules may be adopted across constitutional
rights regarding qualified immunity, tailoring of injunctive remedies, and
liability of local officers.
How can these specifications result in misplaced constitutional remedies? To
provide one example, in the Miranda context it would be wrong to provide an
exclusionary remedy in a civil trial for a non-Mirandized statement; Miranda is
intended to provide a remedy against self-incrimination. A question raised was
whether there is a right to civil damages, as opposed to solely criminal
exclusionary remedies, if police violate Miranda. In Chavez v. Martinez,71 the
Court held that the remedies are solely criminal exclusionary remedies, not civil
ones.72 If a federal court provided a civil damages remedy for a Miranda
64

Id. at 686.
Id. at 687.
66 Id. at 688.
67 Id. at 687.
68 See Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 587 (1983); Daryl J.
Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 857, 860
(1999).
69 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (stating that it does not satisfy due
process requirements “if a State has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial
which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate
deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured”).
70 See Thomas K.S. Fu, Against Doctrinal Convergence in Constitutional Remedies, 10
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 293, 296 (2014).
71 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
72 Id. at 772-73.
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violation prior to the Chavez ruling, perhaps it would not be misapplying the
constitutional right; the question was not settled. However, following the
Court’s ruling in Chavez, such damages would be the wrong remedy for a
violation.
D.

Interpretation Drawing on Multiple Sources

A different type of citation to authority can occur when a court relies on
multiple constitutional sources to support a general proposition or relies on law
in one area to influence interpretation in another. These situations would not be
misplacements in the way that I describe here, although there may be much to
critique (or recommend) in drawing conclusions based on structure or text across
provisions of the Constitution. As John Manning has described, sometimes a
court cites to an area of law not as binding but as influential.73 For example, to
cite to the Ex Post Facto Clause in support of a more general interpretive canon
or principle of nonretroactivity applicable in civil cases may be an inappropriate
leap.74 However, while the analogy made by drawing on a range of constitutional
sources to support a canon of interpretation may be forced or inappropriate, it is
not formal misplacement as I describe it here. The Court is formally drawing on
multiple sources for constitutional authority and is not seeking to apply a
constitutional right or standard to a new area without justifying its decision to
do so.
II.

MISPLACED CONSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCE ON COURTS

In a range of areas, constitutional rights have influenced courts in ways in
which they were not intended to do so. For example, judicial actors have adopted
constitutional floors in areas in which the rights were primarily intended to apply
to executive actors: during the pretrial stage, during police questioning, and in
providing a potential exclusionary remedy before trial. This has occurred in the
context of the well-known Miranda warnings; some courts have misplaced the
right as a component of jury instructions. In other contexts, judges have similarly
misplaced pretrial rights in jury instructions at trial. These misplacements have
occurred in the context of the central due process test for regulating eyewitness
evidence, constitutional remedies such as qualified immunity law, and due
process rules regarding punitive damages. These misplacements have also
influenced jury instructions and, as a result, civil and criminal trials. One reason
for these misplacements may simply be that trial judges and drafters of jury
instructions look to authoritative pronouncements from the Supreme Court and
to constitutional law when drafting instructions, hoping to avoid reversible
errors. In doing so, jury instructions parrot constitutional language for
73

John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399,
432 (2010).
74 Id. at 404, 435 (arguing that, because the Ex Post Facto Clause proscribes enactment of
retroactive criminal penalties, the Founders specifically determined the ways in which and to
what degree to limit the Clause and thus to “[a]bstract[] from that specific proscription to a
background value of nonretroactivity . . . makes nonsense of [the] constitutionmaking
process”).
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evidentiary uses not anticipated by the opinions that defined those constitutional
rights. As such, these instructions can then work against the Court’s goal in
creating the underlying constitutional right.
I focus in this Part on such examples of unintended and potentially perverse
uses of constitutional rights at both the pretrial and trial stages. These uses
include (1) jury instructions that eyewitness identifications should be evaluated
using Supreme Court–derived “reliability” factors that not only do not
correspond with reliability but were never intended to serve that function;
(2) jury instructions affected by Supreme Court rulings on punitive damages
originally designed to guide appellate review; (3) jury instructions suggesting
that Miranda compliance somehow provides evidence of voluntariness, despite
the fact that the Miranda rule was designed to protect against coercion in the
interrogation room; and (4) the misuse of criminal appeal standards in civil
rights litigation.
A.

Eyewitness Identifications: Instructing Jurors on Reliability

The Supreme Court in Manson v. Brathwaite adopted an approach seeking to
reconcile due process concerns with evidentiary concerns in the area of
eyewitness identifications.75 The Court famously emphasized that “reliability is
the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony.”76 The
“reliability” factors as adopted by the Court ask that the judge examine: (1) the
eyewitness’s opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime, (2) the
eyewitness’s degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of the description that the
eyewitness gave of the criminal, (4) the eyewitness’s level of certainty at the
time of the identification procedure, and (5) the length of time between the crime
and the identification procedure.77 Scholars have criticized the test—and I
among them—but that is not the focus here.78 The focus here is on the use that
this test has been put to, wholly outside of the question of whether a trial judge
should have admitted the eyewitness testimony.
That due process test solely regulates the preliminary question of whether to
admit eyewitness testimony at trial, not how that trial should be conducted if the
testimony was properly admitted. Having admitted such testimony, traditionally,
judges provide the jury with brief instructions regarding eyewitness
75

Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 117 (1977).
Id. at 114.
77 Id.
78 For examples of the criticism of the Supreme Court’s due process test in light of
subsequent scientific research, see generally, for example, Suzannah B. Gambell, Comment,
The Need to Revisit the Neil v. Biggers Factors: Suppressing Unreliable Eyewitness
Identifications, 6 WYO. L. REV. 189 (2006); Timothy P. O’Toole & Giovanna Shay, Manson
v. Brathwaite Revisited: Towards a New Rule of Decision for Due Process Challenges to
Eyewitness Identification Procedures, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 109 (2006); and Gary L. Wells &
Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures and the Supreme Court’s
Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1
(2009).
76
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identifications. Such instructions typically remind the jury to consider the
credibility of an eyewitness like that of any other witness or briefly instruct the
jurors that any eyewitness identification is part of the prosecutor’s burden of
proof in a criminal case (although a few states in recent years have adopted more
detailed jury instructions).79 The Supreme Court, in its ruling in Manson, did not
state any intent to regulate the manner in which a jury would be instructed; the
question that the Justices decided was whether and when a judge might exclude
eyewitness identification evidence.80
That is why I was quite surprised to learn that, following the Supreme Court’s
decision in Manson, some state courts supplemented general jury instructions
with respect to judging the credibility of witnesses by including in specific jury
instructions on eyewitness evidence the “reliability” factors named by the Court.
For example, in 1991, the Connecticut Supreme Court approved instructions in
which the judge instructed the jury:
[W]hen deciding the question of identification it should . . . consider the
“totality of all the circumstances affecting identification,” listing the
following specific factors:
“the opportunity which the witness had to observe the person, the degree
of certainty of the identification made in court, whether the witness knew
or had seen the person before the identification, the circumstances and
degree of certainty or uncertainty of any out of court identifications
made . . . the length of time available to make the observations of the
perpetrator . . . the lighting conditions at the time of the crime, any
physical descriptions that the witness may have given to the police, the
physical and emotional condition of the witness at the time of the
incident and the witness’ powers of observation . . . .”81
Other states do the same. Having surveyed jury instructions in all fifty states
and the District of Columbia, I found that eighteen states and the District of
Columbia adopt some standalone instruction on the subject of eyewitness
identification evidence that repeats some version of the factors from the Manson
test.82 For example, the Illinois instruction emphasizes that the “new instruction
79 New Jersey courts used such instructions a decade before State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d
872, 928 (N.J. 2011). See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 754 A.2d 1153, 1157 (N.J. 2000) (“It is
your function as jurors to determine what weight, if any, to give to this testimony. You must
decide whether it is sufficiently reliable evidence upon which to conclude that this defendant
is the person who committed the offenses charged.”).
80 Manson, 432 U.S. at 99.
81 State v. Tatum, 595 A.2d 322, 330 (Conn. 1991) (third and fourth alterations in original),
overruled in part by State v. Dickson, 141 A.3d 810, 830 (Conn. 2016).
82 They are: Alaska, Arizona, California, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, West
Virginia, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia. See, e.g., ILL. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON
JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES, ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL
§ 3.15 (2017) [hereinafter ILL. CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS], https://courts.illinois.gov
/CircuitCourt/CriminalJuryInstructions/CRIM _03.00.pdf [https://perma.cc/E57H-953J];
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simply lists factors well-established by case law” and promptly cites, first in the
list of authorities, to Manson.83 While a decade ago, the vast majority of states
would have had instructions of that type, in recent years, many states have
revised their eyewitness identification jury instruction, departing from the
Manson model. Fifteen states—Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas,
Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Virginia—have included some alterations,
including modestly taking into account some of the more recent social science
research on eyewitness memory.84 The New Jersey Supreme Court has recently
MICH. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, MODEL CRIMINAL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 7-11 (2020) [hereinafter MICH. CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS],
https://courts.michigan.gov/Courts/MichiganSupremeCourt/criminal-juryinstructions/Documents/Criminal%20Jury%20Instructions.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SN9AH9V4]. In some states, such as in South Carolina, the model instructions predate Manson and
reflect the D.C. Circuit’s recommended charges in United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552,
558-59 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See RALPH KING ANDERSON, JR., SOUTH CAROLINA REQUESTS TO
CHARGE – CRIMINAL § 6-1 (2d ed. 2012). Although in the past Alaska did not require any
standard instructions and simply recommended the Telfaire approach, a recent ruling by the
Alaska Supreme Court called for the drafting of revised jury instructions, which were then
promulgated in 2020. ALASKA CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., ALASKA
CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION § 1.24 (2020) (citing Young v. State, 374 P.3d 395,
427
(Alaska
2016)),
https://public.courts.alaska.gov/web/crpji/docs/1.24.docx
[https://perma.cc/4VZ9-MD6J] .
83 ILL. CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 82, § 3.15 committee note, at 19.
84 For example, the Florida instruction tells juries to consider whether the witness and
offender are of different races or ethnic groups and does not include confidence as a factor.
FLA. SUPREME COURT, FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3.9(c) (2018),
https://jury.flcourts.org/wp-content/uploads/Criminal/chapters/chapter3/p1c3s3.9.c.rtf
[https://perma.cc/7FD6-MAH8]. The Georgia Supreme Court altered its instruction, which
had adopted the Manson factors, to no longer emphasize confidence of the eyewitness. See
Brodes v. State, 614 S.E.2d 766, 771 (Ga. 2005). The Kansas Supreme Court followed that
same approach. See State v. Hunt, 69 P.3d 571, 575 (Kan. 2003), overruled in part by State
v. Mitchell, 275 P.3d 905, 912-13 (Kan. 2012) (holding that “it is error to instruct the jury on
the degree of certainty factor” and “discourag[ing] its future use”). The Supreme Court in
Utah altered its instruction to focus on the effects of suggestion, as did the Connecticut
Supreme Court. See State v. Marquez, 967 A.2d 56, 69-71 (Conn. 2009); State v. Ramirez,
817 P.2d 774, 780-81 (Utah 1991), abrogated by State v. Antonio Lujan, 459 P.3d 992, 99596 (Utah 2020) (overruling suggestion that admissibility of eyewitness identification
testimony should be judged under a due process standard and holding that admissibility of
this kind of evidence should be measured by the Utah rules of evidence; see also CRIMINAL
JURY INSTRUCTION COMM., CONNECTICUT JUDICIAL BRANCH CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
§ 2.6-4 cmt. (2019) (citing, inter alia, State v. Dickson, 141 A.3d 810, 817 (Conn. 2016)),
https://jud.ct.gov/JI/Criminal/Criminal.pdf [https://perma.cc/BB5L-78LJ]. New Jersey has
now adopted a revised and detailed jury instruction that rejects the Manson factors as a model.
See infra notes 176-79. Ohio revised its jury instruction in response to a statute requiring
adoption of eyewitness identification procedures. See OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., OHIO
JURY INSTRUCTIONS – CRIMINAL § 409.05 (2012); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.831
(West 2020). Virginia revised its jury instructions to include an eyewitness-specific
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and prominently outright rejected the Manson approach.85 The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Council in 2015 “review[ed] the scholarly research, analyses
by other courts, amici submissions,” and a report by a Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Council Study Group on Eyewitness Identification that recommended
that judges provide a revised set of jury instructions on eyewitness identification
evidence.86 As a result, it included scientific principles in its eyewitness
identification jury instruction.87 The Hawaiian courts have done the same in
recent years.88
Sixteen of the other states do not specifically provide separate instructions on
eyewitness evidence and instead generally instruct jurors that their task is to
judge the credibility of witnesses, and one additional state has no criminal
pattern instructions of any type.89
Some state courts have also gone further and incorporated language from
Supreme Court opinions on a related topic: the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel at lineups. These courts have provided and approved jury instructions
that inform the jury that there may be an “independent source” for an in-court
identification, despite questions concerning earlier pretrial identification
procedures.90 As I have written elsewhere, there is nothing “independent” about
instruction. VA. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., VIRGINIA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS –
CRIMINAL no. 2.800 (2019), http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/circuit/resources/model
_jury_instructions _criminal.pdf [https://perma.cc/AFT3-RFZC]. In addition, certain states
have adopted separate common-law tests concerning show-up identifications. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1261 (Mass. 1995); People v. Adams, 423
N.E.2d 379, 383-84 (N.Y. 1981); State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 599 (Wis. 2005),
overruled by State v. Roberson, 935 N.W.2d 813, 816 (Wis. 2019) (overturning Dubose and
“return[ing] to [the court’s] past practice of following decisions of the United States Supreme
Court in regard to criteria that are necessary to accord due process in eyewitness
identifications”). North Carolina instructs witnesses regarding departures from statutorily
mandated lineup practices. N.C. CONFERENCE OF SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES COMM. ON
PATTERN INSTRUCTIONS, NORTH CAROLINA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CRIMINAL
CASES § 105.65 (2010), https://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/pji-master
/criminal/105.65.pdf [https://perma.cc/99ED-D3KU].
85 See infra notes 176-79.
86 Commonwealth v. Gomes, 22 N.E.3d 897, 905, 909-10 (Mass. 2015).
87 Id. at 909-10.
88 See, e.g., State v. Kaneaiakala, 450 P.3d 761, 774 (Haw. 2019) (“As a result of our
holding in Cabinatan, the Jury Instructions Committee also promulgated Hawaiʻi Standard
Instruction 3.19A regarding show-up identifications . . . .”); State v. Cabagbag, 277 P.3d
1027, 1035-39 (Haw. 2012) (holding that when eyewitness evidence is a central issue, a court
must, at defendant’s request, give a specific jury instruction about factors affecting
reliability); see also HAW. SUPREME COURT, HAW. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL
no.
3.19
(2014),
https://www.courts.state.hi.us/docs/legal_references/criminal_Jury
_Instructions_oct _2014ada.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5YZ-LCQD].
89 Those states are: Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Texas,
and Wyoming. Rhode Island has no pattern criminal jury instructions.
90 See, e.g., State v. Cannon, 713 P.2d 273, 281 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc) (“You are instructed
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the memory of an eyewitness in the courtroom.91 Regardless, the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel at lineups was designed to ensure that a lawyer
would be present at a postindictment lineup; it was not designed to inform the
jury about the reliability or “independence” of the memory of an eyewitness who
picks out the defendant in the courtroom.
Many federal courts adopt a still more dated approach, relying on instructions
from the D.C. Circuit’s 1972 decision in United States v. Telfaire,92 which was
a kind of precursor to the Manson reliability test. Others have pattern
instructions that refer to the Manson reliability test but modify the test in
important respects. For example, the Third Circuit’s eyewitness instruction
states (although I note that a revision to these instructions has been
recommended by a Third Circuit Task Force):93 “you should ask whether the
witness was able to observe and had an adequate opportunity to observe the
person who committed the crime charged.”94 However, the instructions then list
factors such as “whether the witness was under stress while observing the person
who committed the crime” and “whether the witness and the person committing
the crime were of different races.”95 The instructions also cite to witness
certainty and state “you should ask whether the witness is positive in the
identification and whether the witness’ testimony remained positive and
unqualified after cross-examination.”96 Some federal courts also rely on the
factors set out in Manson in deciding whether to give the jury expanded Telfaire
jury instructions on eyewitness identification evidence.97 Oddly enough, their
that you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the in-Court identification was
independant [sic] of the previous pre-trial identification or, if not derived from an independent
source, you must find from other evidence in the case that the defendant is the guilty person
beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
91 See Brandon L. Garrett, Eyewitnesses and Exclusion, 65 VAND. L. REV. 449, 494 (2012).
92 469 F.2d 552, 558-59 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
93 Press Release, Joel McHugh, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Third Circuit
Task Force on Eyewitness Identifications Releases Its Report and Best-Practice
Recommendations (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/sites/ca3/files/Eyewitness
%20ID%20TF_%20Press%20Release%202019%20Report_012720.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3Z49-FGNG].
94 COMM. ON MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS THIRD CIRCUIT, MODEL CRIMINAL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 4.15 (2018), ca3.uscourts.gov/sites/ca3/files/2018%20Chapter%204
%20revisions%20final.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UTR-T4TY].
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 See, e.g., United States v. Thoma, 713 F.2d 604, 607-08 (10th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Masterson, 529 F.2d 30, 31-32 (9th Cir. 1976) (considering “corroborating evidence” in
finding that lower court did not err in declining to “give special jury instructions proposed by
[defendant] on eyewitness identification”); see also Telfaire, 469 F.2d at 558-59. Some
federal courts follow that approach, providing district courts with discretion to not employ the
instructions should they conclude that based on “strong reliability”—assessed using the Neil
v. Biggers/Manson factors—no such instruction is necessary. United States v. Luis, 835 F.2d
37, 41 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972)).
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reasoning seems to be that the Manson test provides a “reliability” framework
for deciding whether to offer additional instructions that convey somewhat
different information to jurors.98 There is nothing about that test that is based on
empirical research concerning reliability of eyewitness evidence; the Justices
crafted the test by drawing from prior case law on admissibility.
In contrast, courts do not currently appear to rely on the Manson test when
deciding whether to admit expert testimony on eyewitness evidence in a criminal
case. The overwhelming trend in state and federal courts in recent years has been
to permit judges to admit such expert evidence.99 However, in the past, some
state courts did cite to the Manson test as a reason not to approve use of experts
on eyewitness identifications, noting that if an identification was sufficiently
“reliable” to admit, then no expert opinion was necessary.100
Such rulings provide another example of courts mistakenly treating a
constitutional floor as a ceiling. Indeed, the Supreme Court justified not
revisiting the Manson test in its 2012 ruling in Perry v. New Hampshire101 by
noting that state evidence law can more directly address reliability concerns for
both expert testimony and “[e]yewitness-specific jury instructions.”102 It is truly
ironic that the Supreme Court failed to address reliability concerns because it
treated the subject as a matter for state evidence law while some state courts
have refused to address reliability concerns because they see the federal
constitutional test as governing. Trial courts can rely on evidence law to
supplement a constitutional test, and they should do so more often in recognition
that a constitutional right may serve a narrower evidentiary purpose. Courts
should not engage in rote repetition of language from a Supreme Court decision
that concerned admissibility and included factors not designed to be an exclusive
list—certainly not when instructing jurors when considering whether to admit
the testimony of an expert or when considering admissibility as a matter of state
evidence law. In several different settings, lower courts extended the Manson
98

Luis, 835 F.2d at 41-42.
Commonwealth v. Walker, 92 A.3d 766, 792 (Pa. 2014) (rejecting per se ban on use of
eyewitness expert evidence and describing how forty-four states, the District of Columbia,
and “all or nearly all federal circuits”—excluding only one—now permit expert testimony on
eyewitness evidence).
100 See, e.g., State v. Outing, 3 A.3d 1, 21 (Conn. 2010) (finding eyewitness expert
testimony at issue inadmissible and noting that “the proper use of this expert testimony calls
into question the soundness of the test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Neil v.
Biggers,” which includes reliability factors subsequently adopted in Manson). But see State
v. Guilbert, 49 A.3d 705, 731 n.33 (Conn. 2012) (rejecting reasoning in Outing and noting
that admissibility of expert testimony raises different issues than admissibility of eyewitness
evidence itself).
101 565 U.S. 228 (2012).
102 Id. at 246 (noting existence of state-law “safeguards” in some states, including
opportunity for defendant to present expert testimony on hazards of eyewitness identification
evidence and availability of “[e]yewitness-specific jury instructions, which many . . . state
courts have adopted, [and which] likewise warn the jury to take care in appraising
identification evidence” (footnote omitted)).
99

2020]

MISPLACED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

2105

test in unintended ways to limit remedies for potentially unreliable eyewitness
evidence in criminal cases.103 Given how much we now know about reliability
concerns with such evidence, the misplacement of due process precedent is
extremely troubling.
B.

Punitive Damages: Instructing the Jury on Appellate Guideposts

The Supreme Court’s due process regulation of punitive damages formally
applies posttrial to require that unconstitutionally excessive verdicts be
reduced.104 As in the examples just discussed, however, the Court’s due process
test has taken hold during civil trials in a manner that may not have been intended
by the Justices. Beginning with its earliest decisions regulating punitive damages
under the Due Process Clause, the Court expressed great deference to state
judges’ instructions to jurors. In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,105
the Court approved instructions that dissenters called “scarcely better than no
guidance at all.”106 The opinion focused on due process standards for postverdict
review, including the use of guideposts to assess whether punitive damages
awards are arbitrarily excessive.107 The Court certainly gave directions that
suggest methods of keeping such verdicts within bounds, but it did not provide
guidance on how to avoid prejudicing jurors when presenting them with
evidence of conduct outside the jurisdiction.108 The Court’s standards are chiefly
designed to govern appeals; for example, the suggestion that a punitive damages
verdict should be no more than a single-digit multiple of the compensatory
damage award is a yardstick for appellate courts, not a calculator for the jurors
to use.109
To be sure, the Court’s decisions in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. v. Campbell110 and Philip Morris USA v. Williams111 do urge that jurors be
instructed on not punishing defendants for out-of-state conduct or conduct
harming nonparty victims. As the Court put it in Philip Morris: “[T]he Due
Process Clause requires States to provide assurance that juries are not asking the
wrong question . . . .”112 Such rulings were intended to affect trial deliberations.
103

See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18-24 (1991).
105 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
106 Id. at 48 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
107 See id. at 22 (majority opinion).
108 See id. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“This jury-like verdict provides
no guidance as to whether any other procedures are sufficiently ‘reasonable,’ and thus
perpetuates the uncertainty that our grant of certiorari in this case was intended to resolve.”).
109 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
110 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
111 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
112 Id. at 355. The State Farm ruling provided guidance that jurors should be instructed
that out-of-state conduct should not be used as a basis for punitive damages. State Farm, 538
U.S. at 422. The Philip Morris ruling stated that it would be “standardless” and impermissible
for a jury to “permit punishment for injuring a nonparty victim.” Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at
104
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However, nothing in rulings concerning guideposts suggests that jurors be
provided with them during deliberations.
Many states have long retained general and minimal instructions on the
subject of punitive damages. Indeed, although some states have revised their
instructions since State Farm to provide more detailed instructions on the
subject, many others have not.113 Even some federal courts retain traditional
punitive damages jury instructions. For example, the Ninth Circuit pattern
instructions simply state: “If you find that punitive damages are appropriate, you
must use reason in setting the amount.”114 The Ninth Circuit has noted that the
due process inquiry “is markedly different from the jury’s determination of a
specific amount of punitive damages; its purpose is to aid in ascertaining the
constitutional ceiling. Unlike the initial damage calculation, determining the
constitutional ceiling on a punitive damage award is a question of law, properly
reserved for the court.”115 The Ninth Circuit added that, “[a]lthough states are
certainly free to incorporate the reasonable relationship concept into jury
instructions, it is also constitutionally permissible . . . to delay the reasonable
relationship inquiry until the judge’s post-verdict review.”116
In contrast, some states have taken the hint from the Supreme Court’s
decisions and adopted substantive due process yardsticks as at least a
discretionary part of their instructions to the jury. In Illinois, for example, “[t]he
amount of punitive damages must be reasonable [and in proportion to the actual

354; see also Anthony J. Franze & Sheila B. Scheuerman, Instructing Juries on Punitive
Damages: Due Process Revisited After State Farm, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 423, 498-524 (2004);
Neil Vidmar & Matthew W. Wolfe, Fairness Through Guidance: Jury Instruction on Punitive
Damages After Philip Morris v. Williams, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 307, 315-20 (2008)
(explaining gaps in jury instructions and proposing that instructions should be more detailed).
113 For an excellent in-depth analysis, see Franze & Scheuerman, supra note 112, at 47086 (noting that ten states maintain minimal jury instructions, eight more states and the District
of Columbia adding only consideration of defendant’s wealth, and twenty-eight states
providing multiple-factor instructions); and Vidmar & Wolfe, supra note 112, at 316-18
(describing issues with jury instructions, including lack of detail and undefined terms). Some
states retain largely traditional instructions with modest additions noting that punitive
damages must be “proportionate” to the actual harm. See, e.g., COMM. ON PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, N.Y. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL § 2:278 (2019) (adding caveats
regarding out-of-state conduct and injury to third parties in response to State Farm and Phillip
Morris). Some states have enacted statutes capping punitive damages, providing for specific
instructions, or a combination of the two. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1(B) (West
2020) (limiting punitive damage awards to greater of $100,000 or amount of actual damages
awarded).
114 NINTH CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT § 5.5 (2020),
http://www3.ce9.uscourts.gov/jury-instructions/sites/default/files/WPD/Civil_Instructions
_2020_5.pdf [https://perma.cc/HRP3-RN22].
115 White v. Ford Motor Co., 500 F.3d 963, 974 (9th Cir. 2007).
116 Id. (citation omitted).
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and potential harm suffered by the plaintiff].”117 “Whether the bracketed
language concerning ‘proportionality’ should be included in the instruction
should be decided on a case by case basis”;118 it is neither mandated nor
prohibited by State Farm or Illinois law.
Here, the array of responses by state and federal courts to the Supreme Court’s
decisions should not be surprising. The Court has been intervening in an area
traditionally defined by common-law standards and, more recently, the subject
of specific state legislation and jury instructions. The Court has not been clear
whether its due process concerns extend to jury instructions, as opposed to
appellate review, except on two discrete subjects—out-of-state conduct and
harm to third parties. The Court has been understandably reluctant to craft an
entire set of more detailed instructions in an area where jurors traditionally had
broad discretion. Indeed, Justices remain unsure whether improved jury
instructions will adequately constrain juries or whether a numerical constraint
posttrial does the job better. For example, in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,119
Justice Souter, writing for the Court, noted that the Justices, having read
examples of ill-defined state jury instructions on punitive damages, have become
“skeptical that verbal formulations, superimposed on general jury instructions,
are the best insurance against unpredictable outliers.”120 Justice Souter found
“obvious” the similarity to the goals of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and the
comparative merits of a “quantified approach.”121 To some, the comparison with
experience under the Sentencing Guidelines would instead provide more of a
cautionary tale for attempts to quantify punishment. Such a comparison begged
the question why the Court is authorized to impose specific caps or ratios, which
are “typically imposed by legislatures, not courts.”122
The Supreme Court moved in two directions at once, both tightening
postverdict limits on the amount of punitive damages and limiting the subjects
about which the jury may be instructed. Regardless of whether the Court’s
approach is advisable, it increasingly touches on matters of policy and the
specifics of the implementation of that policy. As a result, if the Court intends
to continue to intervene in this area and fashion a highly specific due process
mechanism for regulating punitive damages awards, the Court will have to
engage with evidentiary issues in far more detail.123
117

ILL. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES, ILLINOIS PATTERN
JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CIVIL § 35.01 (2007) (second alteration in original),
https://courts.illinois.gov/CircuitCourt/CivilJuryInstructions/35.00.pdf
[https://perma.cc/35NL-Q3DT].
118 Id.
119 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
120 Id. at 504.
121 Id. Justice Stevens dissented as to the “empirical judgments” expressed in that portion
of the opinion. Id. at 516 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
122 Id. at 520 (noting that majority could not point to any state court that imposed particular
ratio).
123 For one scholar’s prediction that the Court may, for the time being, have
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Miranda: Instructing the Jury on Prophylactic Rights

The well-known Miranda warnings that inform a suspect of their Fifth
Amendment rights prior to a custodial interrogation were not intended to provide
rules of evidence to guide jurors in their understanding of how to evaluate a
confession.124 Instead, “[r]equiring Miranda warnings before custodial
interrogation,” the Supreme Court has explained, “provides ‘practical
reinforcement’ for the Fifth Amendment right.”125 Nevertheless, some
prominent jurisdictions instruct jurors on compliance with Miranda. The New
York pattern jury instructions state:
Initially, under our law, before a person in custody may be questioned
by the police [or an assistant district attorney], that person first, must be
advised of his/her rights; second, must understand those rights; and third,
must voluntarily waive those rights and agree to speak to the police [or an
assistant district attorney].
....
Before you may consider as evidence a statement made by the defendant
in response to questioning, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant was advised of his/her rights, understood those rights, and
voluntarily waived those rights and agreed to speak to the police [or an
assistant district attorney]. If you do not make those findings, then you must
disregard the statement and not consider it.126
Other major jurisdictions do the same.127 The New Jersey model charge asks
“whether or not the statement was actually made by the defendant, and, if made,
whether the statement or any portion of it is credible.”128 The New Jersey model
charge then directs the courts to discuss the proof presented before the jury that
relates to the defendant’s Miranda rights or the voluntariness of their
“unceremoniously” ended this era of regulating punitive damages awards, see generally Jim
Gash, The End of an Era: The Supreme Court (Finally) Butts Out of Punitive Damages for
Good, 63 FLA. L. REV. 525 (2011).
124 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984).
125 Id. (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)).
126 COMM. ON CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, NEW YORK CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS:
STATEMENTS (ADMISSIONS, CONFESSIONS) 6-7 (2019) [hereinafter NEW YORK CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS] (first, second, and fourth alterations in original), http://www.nycourts.gov
/judges/cji/1-General/CJI2d.Confession.pdf [https://perma.cc/4J9U-EUB5].
127 Texas has a general jury instruction that instructs the jury on the voluntariness of
confessions, and at least one case assumes that it permits Miranda-related instructions. TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 § 7 (West 2019) (“When the issue [of voluntariness of a
statement made by an accused] is raised by the evidence, the trial judge shall appropriately
instruct the jury, generally, on the law pertaining to such statement.”); Estrada v. State, 313
S.W.3d 274, 300 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (discussing whether defendant was entitled to
“validity of Miranda waiver” instruction pursuant to Article 38.22 § 7).
128 N.J. COURTS, MODEL CRIMINAL JURY CHARGES: STATEMENTS OF DEFENDANT 1 (2010),
https://njcourts.gov/attorneys/assets/criminalcharges/non2c024a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TBL9-MNKB].
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statements.129 Other jurisdictions do not do so. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a)
provides in part: “[T]he trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence
on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to
the confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances.”130
Now, a judge or model instructions committee may simply be looking for
factors relevant to an assessment of the voluntariness of a confession. Indeed,
states may even desire to overprotect federal constitutional rights using their
own evidence rules. Some states have rejected proposed jury instructions on the
question whether the defendant had been given Miranda warnings; the concern
seems to be that the defendant may be trying to relitigate whether Miranda was
violated and to “comment on the weight of the evidence.”131 In a Massachusetts
case, it was the defendant who proposed, and the trial judge who accepted, a jury
instruction explaining: “When the police take a person into custody, they give
him certain warnings before any statements he makes in response to
interrogation will be admissible in evidence. You have probably heard of them;
they are called Miranda warnings.”132 Having lost the suppression hearing, the
defendant may have hoped that the jury would still view the Mirandized
statements as involuntary. One reason states have bent over backwards to
instruct jurors on confessions, including on Miranda—even though it is not a
rule designed to inform evaluation of the evidence—may be that the Supreme
Court has strongly emphasized how important it is that a jury not consider
involuntary confessions. The Court has emphasized that, for example, “[a] trial
judge has a powerful tool at his disposal to protect the constitutional privilege—
the jury instruction” and that when a defendant is silent, “[n]o judge can prevent
jurors from speculating about why a defendant stands mute in the face of a
criminal accusation, but a judge can, and must, if requested to do so, use the
unique power of the jury instruction to reduce that speculation to a minimum.”133
The use of Miranda in jury instructions, however, may not be more protective.
Consider how the fact that a defendant did waive Miranda rights may only
highlight that this was an informed and voluntary confession which followed the
129

Id.
18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (2018). Compare this Washington state instruction: “You may give
such weight and credibility to any alleged out-of-court statements of the defendant as you see
fit, taking into consideration the surrounding circumstances.” WA. STATE SUPREME COURT
COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS, WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CRIMINAL
§ 6.41 (2016), https://govt.westlaw.com/wcrji/Document/Ief9e3bc7e10d11daade1ae871
d9b2cbe?viewType=FullText&originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=Category
PageItem&contextData=(sc.Default) [https://perma.cc/L6GZ-FNBR].
131 Mendoza v. State, 88 S.W.3d 236, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc) (ruling that
trial court properly excluded proposed instructions reciting specific facts and evidence
relating to voluntariness).
132 Commonwealth v. Stone, 877 N.E.2d 620, 627 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (outlining
defendant’s argument on appeal that trial judge’s acceptance of defendant’s proposed
instruction created substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice because instruction suggested
that defendant had been under arrest at time of statement).
133 Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 303 (1981).
130
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waiver. If the defendant did invoke Fifth Amendment rights after receiving
Miranda warnings, unless some exception applied (such as the use of such
statements to impeach the defendant’s testimony at trial),134 the confession
would presumably not be before the jury. The instructions will therefore chiefly
be used to highlight waivers of Miranda rights. The Supreme Court may not
have intended a waiver of Miranda rights to serve as additional evidence that
the confession that followed was in fact a voluntary one. But that is the use that
Miranda may be put to (and it can be put to that use more commonly and
informally when officers emphasize on the stand that they gave all of the
required warnings to the suspect prior to securing a confession statement). While
few criminal cases result in a trial, and the effect of Miranda during
interrogations themselves is a separate and contested question, this account
suggests that rules designed to serve one remedial purpose may be repurposed
by lower courts.
Constitutional rulings are seen as relatively risk-free sources for inclusion in
jury instructions. If a judge instructing a jury or a committee drafting model jury
instructions is seeking language to underscore a point, what could be more
authoritative than quoting the Supreme Court? This may not be an impermissible
or completely unanticipated use of constitutional doctrine, but these examples
do suggest that the process by which constitutional doctrine filters into practice
in the trial courts remains underexamined.
That said, while holding that the defendant may present to the jury
circumstances surrounding the voluntariness of a confession, the Supreme Court
has not encouraged—much less required—judges to instruct jurors regarding the
voluntariness of confessions.135 The Court in Lego v. Twomey136 emphasized
instead that the voluntariness hearing before the judge, using a preponderance
of the evidence standard of proof, is sufficient to determine the confession’s
admissibility, citing to “the normal rule that the admissibility of evidence is a
question for the court rather than the jury.”137 Federal courts, following 18
134

Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (“The shield provided by Miranda
cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of
confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.”). Thus, when “Miranda-defective
statements” are introduced for impeachment, California jury instructions appropriately
require the trial judge to instruct the jury: “You may not consider it as proof that the statement
is true or for any other purpose.” JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL. ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 356 (2020), https://www.courts.ca.gov
/partners/documents/calcrim_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2QQ-AP8J].
135 See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 486 (1972).
136 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
137 Id. at 490; see also id. at 485-86, 486 n.14 (noting that defendant may present
circumstances surrounding taking of confession to jury (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (2018))).
§ 3501(a) provides:
In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of Columbia,
a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall be admissible in evidence if it is
voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial judge shall,
out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge
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U.S.C. § 3501(a), only minimally instruct the jury concerning a confession; the
jurors are told to “give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves
under all the circumstances.”138 State courts need not adhere to that statute, and
nothing in the Court’s rulings forbids states from providing more detailed
guidance concerning the manner in which to weigh confession evidence or
postarrest statements. Few state courts, however, have departed from the bare
minimum of no voluntariness instruction required by the Court.139
determines that the confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and
the trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness
and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it
deserves under all the circumstances.
138 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a); see also, e.g., COMM. ON FED. CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT,
§ 3.09 (2019) http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/pattern-jury-instructions/Pattern_Criminal_Jury
_Instructions_2012ed_includes_2015-2019_changes.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A4D6-LBU4]
(“You must decide whether [the defendant; defendant [name]] actually made the statement
and, if so, how much weight to give to the statement. In making these decisions, you should
consider all of the evidence, including the defendant’s personal characteristics and
circumstances under which the statement may have been made.” (alterations in original));
NINTH CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS
§ 4.1
(2020)
[hereinafter
NINTH
CIRCUIT
MANUAL]
http://www3.ce9.uscourts.gov/jury-instructions/node/355
[https://perma.cc/6TEG-L8HC]
(“It is for you to decide (1) whether the defendant made the statement, and (2) if so, how much
weight to give to it. In making those decisions, you should consider all the evidence about the
statement, including the circumstances under which the defendant may have made it.”).
139 See, e.g., MICH. CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 82, § 4.1(3) (“If you find that the
defendant did make the statement, you may give the statement whatever weight you think it
deserves. In deciding this, you should think about how and when the statement was made, and
about all the other evidence in the case. You may consider the statement in deciding the facts
of the case [and in deciding if you believe the defendant’s testimony in court].” (alteration in
original)). Some states cite to Lego as a reason not to adopt more detailed instructions on
voluntariness. See, e.g., NEVADA MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS:
CONFESSION/ADMISSION 22-23 (on file with the Boston University Law Review)
(“Voluntariness is based on the totality of circumstances, no one factor being controlling. If
you decide that a statement was made voluntarily, then you may consider it in determining
the guilt or innocence of the defendant making the statement.” (citing, inter alia, Lego, 404
U.S. 477)). Other states do provide expanded instructions regarding voluntariness. See, e.g.,
N.H. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS DRAFTING COMM., CRIMINAL
JURY INSTRUCTION ON CONFESSIONS OR ADMISSIONS 14 (Draft
2010)
http://nhba.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/14150801/CJI.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2DKW-4QXZ] (“The basic test is whether the police exerted such an
influence over the defendant that [his] [her] will was overborne. In making this decision, you
should consider all of the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s statements, including
the time and place the [confession] [admissions] occurred, the length of time the defendant
was questioned, and the physical and mental condition of the defendant. You may also
consider the age, education, experience, character and intelligence of the defendant to the
extent that you have heard such evidence.” (alterations in original)); NEW YORK CRIMINAL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 126, at 9.
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Now that many more state statutes require videotaping of interrogations, more
states have added certain additional cautionary jury instructions should not
follow a rule requiring recording of interrogations.140 Perhaps, after many
decades of giving the traditional and minimal instructions endorsed by the
Supreme Court in Lego, we may start to see more experimentation in the
states.141 That Supreme Court rulings not intended to regulate police conduct
may have stifled such experimentation, though, provides an important
cautionary tale.
D.

Civil Causation and Criminal Materiality Standards

A range of constitutional criminal procedure rights include a materiality
standard designed to ensure that during appellate review—or, more typically,
post-conviction review—a court does not grant relief unless the error had an
adequate effect on the criminal verdict at trial. For example, the Brady v.
Maryland142 rule contains that requirement; it is not enough that prosecutors
concealed exculpatory evidence at trial; the petitioner must also show that this
evidence was material.143 A civil case asserting a Brady violation can only be
brought after a conviction is vacated.144 At that phase, however, the context is
now a post-conviction review of a final criminal conviction; the conviction has
been overturned. I have argued elsewhere that, given this procedural posture, the
materiality requirement is not applicable.145 Instead, under § 1983, the question
is whether the Brady violation caused a constitutional violation.146 Nevertheless,
140

See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4505(1) (2016) (“If a defendant testifies contrary to his
or her statement made during a custodial interrogation at a place of detention which was not
electronically recorded, such statement may be used for the purpose of impeachment if it is
shown that the statement was freely, knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made.”); WIS.
STAT. § 972.115(2)(a) (2018) (“If a statement made by a defendant during a custodial
interrogation is admitted into evidence in a trial for a felony before a jury and if an audio or
audio and visual recording of the interrogation is not available, . . . the court shall instruct the
jury that it is the policy of this state to make an audio or audio and visual recording of a
custodial interrogation of a person suspected of committing a felony and that the jury may
consider the absence of an audio or audio and visual recording of the interrogation in
evaluating the evidence relating to the interrogation and the statement in the case . . . .”);
Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 534 (Mass. 2004) (“[T]he jury should
also be advised that the absence of a recording permits (but does not compel) them to conclude
that the Commonwealth has failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
141 For a discussion of social science–informed reliability review of confession evidence,
including through the use of expanded jury instructions, see Brandon L. Garrett,
Contaminated Confessions Revisited, 101 VA. L. REV. 395, 399-419, 429-31 (2015).
142 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
143 Id. at 87; see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (defining material
evidence as that which creates “a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed
to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different”).
144 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).
145 Garrett, supra note 55, at 69-75.
146 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).

2020]

MISPLACED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

2113

some federal courts have applied a “materiality and prejudice” standard, distinct
from the civil causation standard, both in rulings on pretrial motions and in jury
instructions, telling the jury that they must find a “reasonable probability” that
the result of criminal proceedings would have been different if evidence had
been disclosed.147 They have, in my view, mistakenly imported a criminal postconviction standard into a civil setting.
III. MISPLACED CONSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCE ON EXECUTIVES
The prior Part focused on the unintended application of constitutional rules to
the wrong procedural settings, such as in jury instructions or in the determination
the admissibility of evidence at trial. This Part turns to the influence of such
rulings on the wrong government actors, looking at when executive actors
incorporate rules designed to limit remedies in civil cases to their own policies
for executive conduct or for bringing criminal cases. All government officials
should of course be carefully attentive to constitutional limits on their actions.
However, they also should not treat constitutional floors as ceilings that they
cannot improve upon by developing their own practices. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has often been explicit that agencies are free to adopt their own policies
and should do so to supplement the constitutional floor. I also describe how the
Court may have intended to influence police behavior in the Fifth Amendment
context post-Miranda, but I note that the effort has not been successful.
A.

Fourth Amendment Rulings and Police Use-of-Force Policies

One place in which executive actors often adopt constitutional floors as
ceilings is police use of force. There is a still more troubling aspect of the
Supreme Court’s qualified immunity rulings: they have impacted decisionmaking by police and prosecutors in other contexts. Those civil qualified
immunity rulings have impacted prosecutors when deciding whether to
criminally prosecute police for using deadly force. Timothy McGinty, in
deciding not to prosecute the officer who shot Tamir Rice, cited extensively to
the Supreme Court’s ruling in City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan,148 a
case finding that officers benefitted from qualified immunity.149 To the extent
that the Court in Sheehan made statements regarding police tactics and not
judging police with “the 20/20 vision of hindsight,” those statements mixed the
standard for judging force under the Fourth Amendment with the qualified
immunity standards designed to protect “competent officers” from civil
litigation, including litigation based solely on providing “an expert’s report” on
whether the officer’s use of force was advisable.150 Such concern with the
147

See, e.g., Smith v. Holtz, 210 F.3d 186, 197 (3d Cir. 2000) (dismissing Brady claim
because suppressed evidence was not material and not “sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome” (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678)); see also Garrett, supra note 55, at 72.
148 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015).
149 See CUYAHOGA REPORT, supra note 18, at 39 (citing Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1765).
150 Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1777 (quoting Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 1190 (9th Cir.
2002)).
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burdens of defending civil litigation, the uses of summary judgment, and the role
of expert reports in civil litigation, all detailed in the Sheehan decision, should
play no role when considering whether an officer committed a state crime.
More broadly, many prosecutors rely on civil Fourth Amendment case law
when deciding whether to prosecute an officer for the use of force. As Seth
Stoughton has put it: “The constitutional/non-constitutional and criminal/noncriminal lines are totally distinct here,” and yet they have often been “very
casually” imported from one context to the other.151 For federal officers, there is
undoubtedly a separate and important Supremacy Clause concern in ensuring
that federal law and institutions are insulated from state interference.152
Executive actors are not constrained by civil Fourth Amendment case law when
applying state criminal statutes and nor should they be, except to the extent that
they must comply with the constitutional floor. While they may not cite to the
Constitution disingenuously, they are not in fact bound to remain on the
constitutional floor.
To be sure, executive actors can have a great deal of discretion. It may not be
a legal error for such actors to rely on constitutional law in the sense that a court
may use a standard in the wrong way as in the examples discussed. Nor do
executive actors necessarily have to justify the exercise of their discretion;
prosecutors do not have to justify their charging decisions, and police agencies
can adopt the policies that they think are the most valuable in their patrol guides
so long as they follow the constitutional minima. However, to the extent that
actors adopt policies with reference to constitutional standards, I view it as
problematic to cite to standards that do not necessarily apply in that setting
without some further justification. Thus, if a prosecutor justified citing to a civil
Fourth Amendment standard by emphasizing that even more than that would be
required to justify a criminal prosecution, then perhaps that would be a sensible
explanation for the usage. If an officer relies on constitutional authority that is
not in fact applicable in a setting, then that officer has not properly justified a
decision. The officer may have discretion, and there may not be a way to legally
challenge the decision, but it should nevertheless be treated as suspect if there is
a context in which it can be reviewed.
B.

Miranda and Police Policy

The misuse of the Miranda standard at trial may be a symptom of a larger and
understandable confusion regarding how that standard applies during police
151 Leon Neyfakh, Tamir Rice’s Killer Went Free Because of the “Reasonableness Test.”
It Didn’t Have To Be That Way., SLATE (Dec. 31, 2015, 2:18 PM), https://slate.com/newsand-politics/2015/12/the-legal-reason-tamir-rices-killer-wasn-t-prosecuted.html
[https://perma.cc/FS2A-LS94]; see also Chad Flanders & Joseph Welling, Police Use of
Deadly Force: State Statutes 30 Years After Garner, 35 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 109, 126
(2015) (“The standards for criminal liability in a state criminal prosecution do not have to
mimic the standards for a constitutional tort.”).
152 For an excellent discussion, see generally Seth P. Waxman & Trevor W. Morrison,
What Kind of Immunity? Federal Officers, State Criminal Law, and the Supremacy Clause,
112 YALE L.J. 2195 (2003).

2020]

MISPLACED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

2115

interrogations. The Supreme Court’s rulings in the Miranda context and in
related Fifth Amendment contexts make it difficult for law enforcement not only
to sensibly follow Miranda itself but also to adopt a coherent body of best
practices that might improve upon the constitutional floor. Where the Court does
so, it is harder to identify a clearly misplaced use of constitutional doctrine; the
Court may very well be trying to regulate, or at least influence, executive actors.
In such situations, police agencies are free to move beyond the constitutional
framework set out in Supreme Court decisions and supplement it with their own
rules and approaches. It is not a misplacement, or clearly wrong, for executive
actors to adhere to the constitutional floor, so long as they choose to do so. A
reflexive adherence, due to mistaken understanding or lack of realization that
they can build on that floor, however, would be more troubling. Over time,
agencies may increasingly depart from the constitutional floor if it is not
informative. That has occurred in the interrogation context, as is discussed
below. One reason for this departure may be due to a genuine concern that false
confessions can result from following an approach that unduly permits
uninformed and coercive interrogations. However, for other agencies, another
reason to adopt improved practices may have been that those constitutional
rulings have become so complex and incoherent that the system is not worth
gaming.
The Supreme Court’s Fifth Amendment totality-of-the-circumstances test
does not provide useful guidance to law enforcement, creating a body of law that
is both in tension with the Miranda ruling and difficult to follow. The rulings
suggest that, absent a suspect deemed to be in custody, no regulation or guidance
is necessary for police. Yet what “custody” entails is often hard to predict or
understand. Thus, in rulings such as Salinas v. Texas,153 the Supreme Court has
been highly tolerant of police questioning of individuals deemed not to be in
“custody” without providing Miranda warnings and the accompanying
constitutional protections.154
Similarly, the Supreme Court’s Fifth Amendment “voluntariness” test
provides a remedy for undue coercion during custodial interrogations.155
However, that test is multifactored and highly case specific, and it does not
provide clear guidance to law enforcement.156 Courts have upheld the
constitutionality of, for example, extremely lengthy interrogations.157 Indeed,

153

570 U.S. 178 (2013) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 181 (affirming judgment against defendant where defendant was not in custody,
did not receive Miranda warnings, and did not invoke right against self-incrimination).
155 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 302 (1991) (remanding case for new trial at which
confession is not admitted as evidence when confession was coerced by threat of violence).
156 Eve Brensike Primus, The Future of Confession Law: Toward Rules for the
Voluntariness Test, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3 (2015).
157 Welsh S. White, What Is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2001,
2046-47 (1998) (discussing effect of lengthy interrogations on voluntariness of confessions
and citing cases in which courts have nonetheless upheld interrogations lasting nine or more
hours).
154
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the Supreme Court has itself noted that the voluntariness test does not provide
clear guidance to law enforcement. In Dickerson, it stated that “the totality-ofthe-circumstances test . . . is more difficult than Miranda for law enforcement
officers to conform to, and for courts to apply in a consistent manner.”158 Or as
the Court put it far earlier in Haynes v. Washington,159 “The line between proper
and permissible police conduct and techniques and methods offensive to due
process is, at best, a difficult one to draw . . . .”160
The Court has said that “[t]he main purpose of Miranda is to ensure that an
accused is advised of and understands the right to remain silent and the right to
counsel,” and the Miranda rule can be said to provide a simple rule of decision
for police: provide the warnings or be deprived of the use of statements that
follow the police questioning.161 Rather than retain a simple rule to guide police,
though, the Court has held that a waiver of rights may be “implied” from silence,
even after several hours of a suspect remaining silent in the face of police
questioning.162 The Court has permitted “a good-faith Miranda mistake” to
excuse an officer’s failure to provide the warnings in a departure from prior
rulings that typically imposed an objective standard of care upon officers.163 The
standards and distinctions in this area of law are complex. Barry Friedman has
described these rulings as “stealth overruling,” where without explicitly
overruling it, the Court’s subsequent rulings do not appear faithful to the
Miranda decision.164 These complex rulings create opportunities for gaming the
system rather than providing law enforcement with a clear set of best practices
for interviews and interrogations.
The concern shared by many scholars is that the result of this case law was to
encourage police agencies to adopt the constitutional baseline which permits the
flouting of Miranda and related Fifth Amendment law by making use of
exceptions and by generally deemphasizing Miranda warnings, making them
seem like an irrelevant afterthought in order to see that such warnings are
disregarded by the subject.165
158

Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000).
373 U.S. 503 (1963).
160 Id. at 515.
161 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 383 (2010).
162 Id. at 384 (“Butler made clear that a waiver of Miranda rights may be implied through
‘the defendant’s silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct
indicating waiver.’” (quoting North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979))).
163 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 615 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“Although the Elstad
Court expressed no explicit conclusion about either officer’s state of mind, it is fair to read
Elstad as treating the . . . conversation as a good-faith Miranda mistake, not only open to
correction by careful warnings before systematic questioning . . . , but posing no threat to
warn-first practice generally.” (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985))).
164 Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to
Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 16-25 (2010).
165 Richard A. Leo & Welsh S. White, Adapting to Miranda: Modern Interrogators’
Strategies for Dealing with the Obstacles Posed by Miranda, 84 MINN. L. REV. 397, 433-39
(1999).
159
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Commonly used interrogation tactics themselves seem to violate the spirit of
this case law. American police interrogators long used the so-called “Reid
Method.”166 “[This] method emphasizes a set of psychological techniques
designed to confront and accuse a suspect, and then maximize the pressure
placed on the suspect to incriminate themselves, while appearing to minimize
the consequences for the suspect in doing so.”167 The techniques tend to rely on
“some form of deception,” ranging from “rationalization” of the person’s actions
to outright “evidence fabrication.”168 Perhaps, though, the Supreme Court over
time, in “stealth overruling” Miranda, used its rulings to encourage agencies to
adopt such approaches. The Court’s rulings may have tacitly encouraged highly
coercive interrogation tactics. If so, then this was not the Court standing by as
its constitutional rulings were misapplied. Instead, the Court intended and
encouraged police use of its more recent rulings (like those creating exceptions
to Miranda) to replace reliance on its older rulings like Miranda.
However, the story is more complex still because the Supreme Court may not
have accomplished what it intended. Arguably due to the confusing guidance
provided by the more recent decisions, the message they have sent may have
been lost on policing agencies. Traditional interrogation methods have been
evolving in the United States; Wicklander-Zulawski & Associates, perhaps the
leading interrogation training provider, no longer trains on the Reid Method.169
The federal High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group (“HIG”), which includes
members of the CIA, FBI, and other federal law enforcement, has developed
interrogation best practices that similarly focus on questioning that is designed
to build rapport and “draw out what the detainee knows as opposed to only
focusing on [what] the intelligence the team would like to obtain.”170 “Police
departments, including in Dallas, Philadelphia, and Los Angeles, have begun to
use the approach developed by the HIG.”171 Recording police interrogations, an
approach neither encouraged nor discouraged by federal constitutional rulings,
has become extremely common; it has been voluntarily adopted by police

166 FRED E. INBAU, JOHN E. REID, JOSEPH P. BUCKLEY & BRIAN C. JAYNE, CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 339-50 (5th ed. 2013) (discussing Reid Method on how to
distinguish between true and false confessions).
167 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: POLICING § 11.01, at 104 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No.
2, 2019).
168 Christopher Slobogin, Manipulation of Suspects and Unrecorded Questioning: After
Fifty Years of Miranda Jurisprudence, Still Two (or Maybe Three) Burning Issues, 97 B.U. L.
REV. 1157, 1160-61 (2017).
169 Eli Hager, The Seismic Change in Police Interrogations, MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 7,
2017, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/03/07/the-seismic-change-inpolice-interrogations [https://perma.cc/SX3V-6J37].
170 HIGH-VALUE DETAINEE INTERROGATION GRP., INTERROGATION BEST PRACTICES 2
(2016),
https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/hig-report-august-2016.pdf/view
[https://perma.cc/S5FC-UVAJ].
171 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: POLICING § 11.01, at 104 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No.
2, 2019).
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agencies, required or encouraged by model policies, required by state statutes,
and required or encouraged by state court rulings.172
The Supreme Court may have nudged its constitutional floor in the direction
of a ceiling,173 but over time that effort may have failed. Increasingly, police
agencies and state court rulings nevertheless treat those rulings as a floor that
they should build upon. In that way, the experience of the adoption and
nonadoption of constitutional law concerning police interrogations is a hopeful
one. Over time, executive actors can learn from their experience in using
constitutional rules and can make more informed decisions about whether and
how to rely upon those constitutional rules.
C.

Eyewitness Identification Procedure

In the jury instruction area, state courts, police agencies, and lawmakers in
recent years have increasingly stepped away from the Manson decision when
crafting reformed jury instructions and police practices in the area of eyewitness
identifications. They have (correctly in my opinion) come to the view that the
constitutional rule is only a floor and not a ceiling. In doing so, they have cited
to more recent scientific research as a reason to revise or update the manner in
which the judge explains the “reliability” of an eyewitness identification to the
jury.174 As the National Academy of Sciences has put it: “The best guidance for
legal regulation of eyewitness identification evidence comes not . . . from
constitutional rulings, but from the careful use and understanding of scientific
evidence to guide fact-finders and decision-makers.”175
172 Thomas P. Sullivan & Andrew W. Vail, The Consequences of Law Enforcement
Officials’ Failure to Record Custodial Interviews As Required by Law, 99 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 215, 228-34 (2009) (listing police departments that employ video recording in
every state and the District of Columbia); see also Saul M. Kassin, Richard A. Leo, Christian
A. Meissner, Kimberly D. Richman, Lori H. Colwell, Amy-May Leach & Dana La Fon,
Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report Survey of Police Practices and Beliefs,
31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 381, 382 (2007) (listing observation of taped interrogations as basis
for empirical study); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: POLICING § 11.02, at 109-12 (AM. LAW INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019).
173 Indeed, scholars who are critical of Miranda because they view it as overly regulating
police and those who believe it did not go nearly far enough agree that moving away from
Supreme Court case law has been a positive development. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell,
Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost Confessions—and from Miranda,
88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497, 503 (1998) (“To protect the innocent, videotaping of
police interrogation should be substituted for the Miranda rules.”); Richard A. Leo, Peter J.
Neufeld, Steven A. Drizin & Andrew E. Taslitz, Promoting Accuracy in the Use of Confession
Evidence: An Argument for Pretrial Reliability Assessments to Prevent Wrongful Convictions,
85 TEMP. L. REV. 759, 790 (2013) (“Miranda fails to offer any meaningful protection against
the elicitation of false confessions or the admission of false and unreliable confessions into
evidence at trial.”).
174 For a detailed discussion of state jury instructions in this area and their evolution, see
NRC REPORT, supra note 15, at 40-43.
175 Id. at 44.
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The most dramatic shift in any state court occurred in 2011, when the New
Jersey Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision in State v. Henderson.176 In
2012, that court released an expanded jury instruction, a new court rule, and a
revised court rule relating to eyewitness identifications in criminal cases.177 The
jury instruction contains a highly detailed set of factors that, if implicated in a
given case, are to be used to explain to jurors how to assess eyewitness
identification evidence.178 The Oregon Supreme Court in its State v. Lawson179
decision instead rejected Manson as useful as a matter of state evidence law,
relying instead on an analysis similar to that under Federal Rule of Evidence 403
to rule that scientific evidence should inform the question of whether an
eyewitness identification should be excluded as unduly prejudicial or whether
cautionary instructions are warranted.180 The third state high court to intervene
has been the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which, in Commonwealth
v. Gomes,181 recently adopted a far more concise jury instruction that conveys
similar information about scientific research on eyewitness memory.182 The
National Academy of Sciences report counseled that more research needs to be
done to study what types of jury instructions are effective and that use of expert
testimony is preferable; the report added that, as a second-best alternative,
judges should provide a concise set of instructions that is easily understandable
to a jury.183
A few other courts have rejected the Manson approach in part, making
piecemeal improvements to their evidentiary rules. The Georgia Supreme Court
concluded in 2005 that one particular use of the Manson factors was no longer
to be permitted, stating, “[W]e can no longer endorse an instruction authorizing
176 27 A.3d 872, 928 (N.J. 2011) (modifying framework for evaluating reliability of
eyewitness testimony based on scientific evidence).
177 See N.J. CT. R. 3:11 (explaining requirements for out-of-court suspect identification
procedure); N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3 (rendering discoverable in a criminal proceeding all records
related to identification procedures); N.J. COURTS, MODEL CRIMINAL JURY CHARGES,
IDENTIFICATION: IN-COURT AND OUT-OF-COURT IDENTIFICATIONS 2-8 (2012) [hereinafter N.J.
MODEL CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS], https://www.njcourts.gov/attorneys/assets/criminalcharges
/idinout.pdf [https://perma.cc/MXK5-WEYA] (setting forth jury charges explaining to jurors
scientific research on accuracy of memory).
178 N.J. MODEL CRIMINAL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 177, at 2-8.
179 291 P.3d 673 (Or. 2012) (en banc).
180 Id. at 690-97 (concluding that the Manson framework is inadequate and describing
revised procedures).
181 22 N.E.3d 897 (Mass. 2015).
182 Id. at 918-27 (setting forth provisional model jury instruction).
183 See NRC REPORT, supra note 15, at 42-43 (“Expert testimony on eyewitness
memory . . . appears to have many advantages . . . . However, when expert testimony is not
available . . . , jury instructions may be a preferable alternative means to inform the jury of
the findings of scientific research . . . . Brief instructions may not, however, provide sufficient
guidance to explain the relevant scientific evidence to the jury, but lengthy instructions may
be cumbersome and complex. More research is warranted to better understand how best to
communicate to jurors the factors that may affect the validity of eyewitness testimony . . . .”).
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jurors to consider the witness’s certainty in his/her identification as a factor to
be used in deciding the reliability of that identification.”184 Other courts have
done the same, modifying the Manson factors by discarding from jury
instructions any instruction as to eyewitness confidence or certainty.185 Like the
Third Circuit, the First Circuit Court of Appeals recently endorsed more detailed
instructions concerning cross-racial identifications, identification under stress,
the relevance of witness confidence, and use of suggestive identification
practices.186
Traditionally, many law enforcement agencies either had policies that were
decades out of date or had no written policies at all; the brief policies that did
exist often simply restated federal constitutional law.187 Often, any training that
these agencies conducted was informal.188 Many agencies had policies that
largely repeated what the federal due process test states about avoiding undue
suggestion in lineups.189 As in the interrogation setting, however, that may be
changing. There is evidence, for example, that model policies can encourage
agencies to adopt more evidence-informed approaches towards lineups.190 In
recent years, there is evidence that more police agencies have adopted revised
eyewitness identification policies.191
184

Brodes v. State, 614 S.E.2d 766, 771 (Ga. 2005).
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Payne, 690 N.E.2d 443, 448 (Mass. 1998) (“[W]e recently
held . . . that language telling the jury to take into account the strength of the identification
‘should be omitted from the standard instruction concerning eyewitness testimony’ . . . .”
(quoting Commonwealth v. Santoli, 680 N.E.2d 1116, 1121 (Mass. 1997))); State v. Romero,
922 A.2d 693, 703 (N.J. 2007) (“[A] witness’s level of confidence, standing alone, may not
be an indication of the reliability of the identification.” (emphasis omitted)).
186 United States v. Jones, 689 F.3d 12, 19-20 (1st Cir. 2012) (“[W]e agree
that . . . information bearing on the effects of stress, witness confidence and cross-racial
identification would be helpful to the jury in the present case . . . .”). Updated First Circuit
pattern jury instructions reflecting those additions cited to guidance from the American Bar
Association and from the Henderson decision in New Jersey. NANCY TORRESEN, U.S.
DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MAINE, 2019 REVISIONS TO PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT § 2.22 (2019),
https://www.med.uscourts.gov/pdf/crpjilinks.pdf [https://perma.cc/WW7N-EU6A].
187 See, e.g., POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, A NATIONAL SURVEY OF EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES IN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 46-47 (2013),
https://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/Eyewitness_Identificatio
n/a%20national%20survey%20of%20eyewitness%20identification%20procedures%20in%2
0law%20enforcement%20agencies%202013.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7XR-FUEN].
188 Michael S. Wogalter, Roy S. Malpass & Dawn E. McQuiston, A National Survey of US
Police on Preparation and Conduct of Identification Lineups, 10 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 69,
79 (2004) (finding that, of 220 agencies surveyed, over half reported no formal training on
eyewitness identification procedures).
189 Id.
190 Albright & Garrett, supra note 10, at 52-56 (describing adoption of model policies
regarding eyewitness evidence in twenty-nine states and the federal government).
191 Brandon L. Garrett, Eyewitness Identifications and Police Practices: A Virginia Case
Study, 2 VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 18 (2014) (finding that few Virginia law enforcement policies
185
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State lawmakers have required that police agencies adopt a series of best
practices in their identification policies.192 When state statutes are not informed
by constitutional rules, the drafters may have shied away from permitting clear
remedies in court since they cannot point to a due process violation requiring
exclusion if agencies do not comply.193 If so, they should not have been so
focused on federal constitutional law as a model.
IV. AVOIDING MISPLACED CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The examples discussed in the previous Part include rules relevant to both
civil and criminal cases, rules governing judges and executive actors, and rules
informing lawmakers. The ramifications of each example extend beyond cases
that go to trial, since they may affect civil settlement and plea bargaining in the
vast majority of cases that do not proceed to trial. What can better prevent the
use of constitutional language in evidentiary contexts for which it was not
intended? I suggest that far more care should be paid both to the interpretation
of constitutional rights that affect evidence practice and to evidence practice
itself. What that care means depends on who the actor is; courts may be quite
constrained to appropriately employ constitutional standards, while executive
actors may have quite a bit of discretion. It may merely be advisable to correctly
cite to and explain the use of a constitutional standard. I also describe lessons
learned from efforts to intentionally use constitutional rules to influence courts
and executive actors, such as the cautionary post-Miranda story described in
Part III.
A.

Clear Statement Rules

One way to address the misplacement problem is to insist that courts more
clearly state to which actor, procedural setting, or remedy a constitutional right
is addressed. Such a rule could be seen as a type of clear statement rule. Rather
than require, say, lawmakers to clearly state whether they seek to achieve a result
that implicates a constitutional right, this type of rule would require a clear
statement that an actor intends to rely on constitutional text in a new setting.194
Courts should explain that a constitutional right is designed with an actor or
setting or remedy in mind, and they should step in if actors use constitutional
language in unintended ways. Not only should they make clear statements that
they intend to displace state or administrative law, but courts should engage in
complied with state model policy on lineup procedures). But see Brandon L. Garrett, SelfPolicing: Dissemination and Adoption of Police Eyewitness Policies in Virginia, 105 VA. L.
REV. ONLINE 96, 109 (2019) (describing widespread adoption of state model policy since 2014
study).
192 Albright & Garrett, supra note 10, at 47-52.
193 Id. at app. A (appendix on file with the Boston University Law Review) (detailing each
of these state statutes and noting that none requires judicial remedies for violations).
194 Manning, supra note 73, at 401 (describing such clear statement rules which “insist that
Congress express itself clearly when it wishes to adopt a policy that presses against a favored
constitutional value”).
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careful consideration before awarding deference to or using constitutional rights
and norms in contexts in which they do not formally apply.
One challenge is that the constitutional problem is less visible when courts
claim to be adhering to a constitutional test but are in fact using that test for
different or even inconsistent purposes. It can seem cautious to rely on
constitutional text when in doubt. Soliciting briefs on trial and evidentiary
practice could perhaps better inform such rulings, and lower courts may be better
able to assess the practical problems posed. Doing this can also create, I have
suggested, more incentives for lower courts to document rulings and model
rulings and instructions, creating a record and making it easier for other courts
to know to what evidentiary uses constitutional rulings are put.195
When courts or executive actors cite to and rely upon constitutional standards,
one abiding lesson should be that recitation of constitutional language should
not be enough. Deference to constitutional law and norms should not be
automatic when not required or even intended. Careful attention should be paid
to whether that constitutional test is serving its purpose when extended into a
new context.
Thus, when state courts adopt the federal rule for a constitutional right,
observers should ask whether they should rather have built upon the
constitutional floor rather than just hewed to the minimum. They are not
misplacing a constitutional right; the federal minimum does apply, but it does
not constrain them from doing more. All too often though, states have adopted
federal standards without serious justification for doing so.196 Similarly, judges,
when crafting jury instructions or in their own rulings, may parrot a
constitutional standard rather than considering what standard suits the problem.
The adoption of a standard by the Supreme Court can simply disincentivize
government actors from further regulating an area.197 The costs to sound policy
can be substantial and unintended.

195

See Garrett, supra note 1, at 117.
See, e.g., Chelf v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 515 N.W.2d 353, 356 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994)
(finding that state law supports objective approach to determining whether officer used
excessive force but deriving standard from Graham v. Connor rather than state law sources);
Caudillo v. City of Phoenix, No. 1 CA-CV 09-0467, 2010 WL 2146408, at *4 n.6 (Ariz. Ct.
App. May 27, 2010) (“It appears . . . that [the officer] was ‘effectuating an arrest’ because his
use of deadly force against Celaya constituted a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.”).
But see Hayes v. Cty. of San Diego, 305 P.3d 252, 263 (2013) (finding that “state negligence
law . . . is broader than federal Fourth Amendment law”); SETH W. STOUGHTON, JEFFREY J.
NOBLE & GEOFFREY P. ALPERT, EVALUATING POLICE USES OF FORCE 70-71 (2020) (“Thirtytwo states, a significant majority, have simply not referenced constitutional law when
interpreting or applying state law in the context of deadly force . . . .”).
197 William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV.
781, 793 (2006).
196
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Common Placement

The misplacement of constitutional tests, as described in this Article, raises a
larger question of the use of one line of constitutional interpretation to influence
another area of doctrine. So-called constitutional “borrowing” may sometimes
be quite appropriate and desirable, but sometimes is not.198 In some areas, while
the constitutional text arguably does not cover a different actor, remedy, or
procedural context, the Supreme Court may have interpreted the right as
applying in that other setting.
This type of convergence may not necessarily be problematic at all if similar
interests are served in the other setting. For example, the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel, as noted, has been interpreted as applying to only critical phases of a
criminal trial.199 However, the Court has ruled that on appeal, there are similar
due process and equal protection rights to counsel, with similar rights to
effective assistance of counsel and to representation for an indigent defendant.200
Similarly, while the right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment applies
only in criminal cases, the Supreme Court has held that juveniles have a similar
right in juvenile cases under the due process and equal protection clauses.201 The
goals of those other amendments may overlap, providing analogous protections.
Importantly, the Court has been clear that the juveniles’ right to counsel rests on
different constitutional grounds than the Sixth Amendment, showing how there
may be different sources for protection in contexts not covered by a certain
constitutional right. As such, the Court may borrow standards or approaches, but
it does not formally misplace one standard in a different context.
That said, even if there is a good reason for a constitutional rule to influence
a setting in which it is not formally binding, the rule must also be adapted to that
setting. I have described how the Supreme Court’s post-Miranda rulings are so
complex that they provide poor guidance to law enforcement. They are not fit
for that setting because officers require clear policy and training. Similarly, as
described next, jury instructions may not be well adapted to reflect the types of
considerations that inform constitutional rights, since they are typically designed
to inform jurors about the type and weight of evidence they should consider and
not whether a person’s rights were violated.

198

See Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459,
467-71 (2010) (juxtaposing benefits of constitutional borrowing with risks thereof, such as
creating legal discordance).
199 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972).
200 Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 617-24 (2005); Martinez v. Court of Appeal, Fourth
Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 155 (2000) (“The right to counsel on appeal stems from the
due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, not from the Sixth
Amendment . . . .” (quoting People v. Scott, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 315, 318 (Ct. App. 1998))).
201 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 57 (1967) (“[A]bsent a valid confession, a determination of
delinquency and an order of commitment to a state institution cannot be sustained in the
absence of sworn testimony subjected to the opportunity for cross-examination in accordance
with our law and constitutional requirements.”).
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Rethinking Jury Instructions

The use of constitutional rights in jury instructions—and in evidentiary
practice more generally—is a subject that deserves far more attention in the bar
and in scholarship. However, it is a challenge to get good information about what
those uses are, and it will always be a challenge to secure better practice in the
courts. One of many underlying practical problems is that model jury
instructions do not exist in some jurisdictions, and in many, the pattern
instructions are not always followed, infrequently updated, and assembled by
court-convened or bar committees with an informal or nontransparent process.
Jury instructions may only be called into question if a judge fails to conform to
a constitutional standard. As a result, judges err on the side of using “technically
correct legal language,” even if it may be incomprehensible to lay jurors.202
Parroting constitutional rulings may seem like good insurance against appellate
reversal. Jury instructions may be called into question when they become
decades out of date and controversial, but the pace of change is often quite slow.
Far more attention should be paid to whether constitutional rulings are
actually implemented in evidentiary practice—in rules of evidence, in judicial
rulings, and in jury instructions. Trial error is commonly not preserved on
appeal, making poor compliance hard to remedy in the courts. Overuse of a
constitutional test may be harder to detect or less glaring than outright violations
of constitutional dictates. One of the main goals of this Article is to bring to light
the fact that unintended misplacement of constitutional language can pose
serious problems as well.
Indeed, while it is not an example of constitutional language being misplaced
in jury instructions, a related problem exists in the area of qualified immunity.
In a broad set of remedial restrictions set out by the Supreme Court, executive
officials may benefit from qualified immunity as a defense from a constitutional
suit.203 In a constitutional tort case brought under § 1983, official defendants
may assert qualified immunity as a defense; most are not entitled to “absolute”
immunity from suit.204 The first question is whether “the officer’s conduct
violated a constitutional right.”205 Second, the test asks whether an objectively
reasonable officer in the defendant’s position would have acted that way given
clearly established constitutional law at the time.206 In some cases, unresolved
202 Wylie A. Aitken, Comment, The Jury Instruction Process—Apathy or Aggressive
Reform?, 49 MARQ. L. REV. 137, 139 (1965).
203 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982).
204 Id.
205 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 236, 242-43 (2009) (relaxing Saucier’s two-step inquiry for determining whether
qualified immunity applies such that the order is “no longer . . . regarded as mandatory”).
206 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236-37; Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (stating that
unlawfulness can be apparent “even in novel factual circumstances”); Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987) (“The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. This is not to
say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question
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questions of fact will make it impossible for the judge to rule on qualified
immunity before the time of trial.207 The purposes of qualified immunity
dissipate “once a claim has reached a jury trial, [because] concerns about
discovery and summary judgment are moot.”208
Thus, qualified immunity doctrine attaches to particular officers—namely
executive officers—and at particular stages in particular proceedings—namely
pretrial motion to dismiss and summary judgment dispositions in civil damages
trials. As a result, it would be erroneous to rely on the Supreme Court’s qualified
immunity law in a criminal proceeding or regarding a nonexecutive official
(such as a judge, for whom the Court has ruled absolute immunity attaches).209
Moreover, federal judges often misplace these qualified immunity standards at
trial instead of just using them during pretrial. For example, they do so when
instructing juries in § 1983 suits based on Fourth Amendment excessive force
claims.210 The Fourth Amendment constitutional standard of reasonableness
itself involves a complex underlying body of case law, adopting a flexible set of
principles that state that officers generally may not use unreasonable force but
with exceptions depending on the circumstances they face.211 As Rachel Harmon
has put it, the jury instructions in the area “sometimes provide exceptionally
little help in shaping a determination about excessiveness.”212 Additional
considerations regarding the legal question of qualified immunity make the
subject still more complex. Questions relating to qualified immunity should not
be put to the jury “routinely”; rather, as the Supreme Court has said, “Immunity
ordinarily should be decided by the court long before trial.”213

has previously been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the
unlawfulness must be apparent.” (citation omitted)); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341
(1986) (finding that qualified immunity defense may apply “if the defendant acted in an
objectively reasonable manner”); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (“We therefore hold that
government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”).
207 See, e.g., Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2002).
208 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT, INSTRUCTIONS FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
CLAIMS UNDER SECTION 1983 § 4.7.2, at 66 (2014) [hereinafter THIRD CIRCUIT CIVIL
INSTRUCTIONS],
https://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/sites/ca3/files/4_Chap_4_2014_fall.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L93C-EANF].
209 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967).
210 See supra Section III.A.
211 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205 (“Because ‘police officers are often forced to make splitsecond judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about
the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation,’ the reasonableness of the
officer’s belief as to the appropriate level of force should be judged from that on-scene
perspective.” (citation omitted) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989)).
212 Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1119,
1144-45 (2008).
213 Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991) (per curiam).
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To be sure, a judge can reverse on summary judgment until after a jury
verdict, but that is different than using qualified immunity as a standard that
jurors are obligated to employ when they reach their verdict. Some courts have
held that “[i]t is error, however, to submit the ultimate question of qualified
immunity to the jury.”214 The rationale is that “[t]he issue of qualified immunity
is a question of law for the court, rather than the jury, to decide: ‘[I]t is the
province of the jury to determine disputed predicate facts, the question of
qualified immunity is one of law for the court.’”215 But there remains “a split
among the circuits as to the proper apportionment of responsibility between
juries and judges in this context.”216 The Fifth Circuit has long held that “if
[qualified immunity] is not decided until trial the defense goes to the jury which
must then determine the objective legal reasonableness of the officers’
conduct.”217

214

Littrell v. Franklin, 388 F.3d 578, 586 (8th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 584-85 (second alteration in original) (quoting Peterson v. City of Plymouth, 60
F.3d 469, 473 n.6 (8th Cir. 1995)).
216 Id. at 587; see also, e.g., Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 211 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[W]hether
an officer made a reasonable mistake of law and is thus entitled to qualified immunity is a
question of law that is properly answered by the court, not a jury. When a district court submits
that question of law to a jury, it commits reversible error.” (citation omitted)); Willingham v.
Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 560 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that the court should submit any questions
of material fact to the jury but reserve legal question of qualified immunity for itself);
Riccardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521, 526 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Immunity . . . is a matter of law for
the court, to be decided without deference to the jury’s resolution—and preferably before the
case goes to the jury.”); Cowan ex rel. Estate of Cooper v. Breen, 352 F.3d 756, 764 (2d Cir.
2003) (“[A]lthough the factual disputes in the instant case that must be resolved by the jury
go both to the excessive force and to the qualified immunity questions, the qualified immunity
issue is ‘a question of law better left for the court to decide.’” (quoting Warren v. Dwyer, 906
F.2d 70, 76 (2d Cir. 1990))); Suboh v. Dist. Att’y’s Office, 298 F.3d 81, 90 (1st Cir. 2002)
(stating that questions in qualified immunity inquiry are issues of law, though they may entail
preliminary factual determinations); Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1318 (11th Cir.
2002) (“When the case goes to trial, the jury itself decides the issues of historical fact that are
determinative of the qualified immunity defense, but the jury does not apply the law relating
to qualified immunity to those historical facts it finds; that is the court’s duty.”); Alvarado v.
Picur, 859 F.2d 448, 451 (7th Cir. 1988) (rejecting jury instruction that told jurors that
defendants would be immune if their actions did not violate clearly established law, querying
“[h]ow was the jury supposed to determine the law on the dates in question? And, if the jury
somehow could determine the law on the dates in question, how was it supposed to determine
if that law was ‘clearly established’?”); McIntosh v. Weinberger, 810 F.2d 1411, 1431 n.8
(8th Cir. 1987) (“The court, rather than the trier of fact, is to determine ‘whether the facts
alleged . . . support a claim of violation of clearly established law.’” (quoting Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 n.9 (1985) (alteration in original))), vacated and remanded sub
nom. Turner v. McIntosh, 487 U.S. 1212 (1988). But see McCardle v. Haddad, 131 F.3d 43,
50 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Where the qualified immunity defense has not been resolved prior to trial,
it may be presented to the jury or it may be decided by the court as a matter of law.”).
217 McCoy v. Hernandez, 203 F.3d 371, 376 (5th Cir. 2000); accord Keylon v. City of
Albuquerque, 535 F.3d 1210, 1218 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[I]n exceptional circumstances
215
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Pattern jury instructions reflect these differences.218 There is also the separate
question of whether it may mislead jurors to hear additional instructions granting

historical facts may be so intertwined with the law that a jury question is appropriate as to
whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have known that his conduct
violated that right.” (quoting Maestas v. Lujan, 351 F.3d 1001, 1007 (10th Cir. 2003)));
Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 900 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[W]here the legal
question of qualified immunity turns upon which version of the facts one accepts, the jury,
not the judge, must determine liability.” (quoting Pouillon v. City of Owosso, 206 F.3d 711,
715 (6th Cir. 2000))); Sikes v. Gaytan, 218 F.3d 491, 493-94 (5th Cir. 2000) (allowing single
jury instruction on issues of liability and qualified immunity); Ortega v. O’Connor, 146 F.3d
1149, 1156 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that, where factual disputes existed, qualified immunity
question required jury’s determination); Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 800 (5th Cir.
1998) (“So, ‘if . . . there remain disputed issues of material fact relative to immunity, the jury,
properly instructed, may decide the question.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Presley v. City
of Benbrook, 4 F.3d 405, 410 (5th Cir. 1993))).
218 See 5 LEONARD B. SAND, JOHN S. SIFFERT, WALTER P. LOUGHLIN, STEVEN A. REISS &
NANCY BATTERMAN, MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL § 87-86 (2001)
(instructing jury to make determination regarding qualified immunity); MARTIN. A.
SCHWARTZ & GEORGE C. PRATT, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 17.02.1 (2d
ed. 2020) (instructing jury to decide qualified immunity question based on Fifth Circuit
approach). But see COMM. ON MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DIST. COURTS OF THE
EIGHTH CIRCUIT, MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF
§ 4.42, at 4–18 (2019), http://www.juryinstructions.ca8
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
.uscourts.gov/REV4.1CivilJuryInstructions.pdf [https://perma.cc/BS9C-KAAA] (“[T]he
issue of good faith immunity is an issue the judge must decide; it is not a jury issue.”); COMM.
ON PATTERN CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, FEDERAL CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 7.18, at 156 (2009), http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov
/Pattern_Jury_Instr/7th_civ_instruc_2009.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3R7H-ATCP]
(stating
Seventh Circuit’s view that qualified immunity presents no jury questions and is to be
resolved solely by court); FIFTH CIRCUIT DIST. JUDGES ASS’N COMM. ON PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL CASES) § 10.3, at 94 (rev. ed. 2020),
www.lb5.uscourts.gov/juryinstructions/Fifth/2020civil.pdf [https://perma.cc/UDM7-NSHR]
(“If, after considering the scope of discretion and responsibility generally given to [specify
type of officers/officials] in performing their duties and after considering all of the
circumstances of this case as they would have reasonably appeared to Defendant [name] at
the time of the [specify disputed act], you find that Plaintiff [name] failed to prove that no
reasonable [officer/official] could have believed that the [specify disputed act] was lawful,
then Defendant [name] is entitled to qualified immunity, and your verdict must be for
Defendant [name] on those claims.” (alterations in original)); NINTH CIRCUIT JURY
INSTRUCTIONS COMM., MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 9.34 cmt. (2020)
(“The committee has not formulated any instructions concerning qualified immunity because
most issues of qualified immunity are resolved before trial . . . .”); SCHWARTZ & PRATT,
supra, § 17.02.1 (stating that giving qualified immunity instruction to jury is a minority view
among jurisdictions); THIRD CIRCUIT CIVIL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 208, § 4.7.2, at 63 (“If
there are no disputes concerning the relevant historical facts, then qualified immunity presents
a question of law to be resolved by the court.”). Additional circuits do not have civil pattern
jury instructions.
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immunity separate from the question of whether the constitutional rights of the
defendant were violated. As Judge Jon. O. Newman has commented:
To most jurors hearing a jury instruction on the defense of qualified
immunity, it simply sounds as if the officer should not be found liable if he
[subjectively] thought he was behaving lawfully, and many jurors will give
him the benefit of the doubt on that issue, even if they think his conduct
was improper.219
That question has real importance where a municipality may still be held
liable for a constitutional violation even if the individual officers are found
immune.220 The Fifth Circuit qualified immunity instruction raises still
additional problems because it suggests to jurors that the officers’ subjective
belief as to the reasonableness of their actions might be relevant, despite the fact
that the Supreme Court has rejected a subjective qualified immunity test.221
Some courts state that the jury may have a limited role in informing the
judge’s decision regarding qualified immunity. In the Eighth Circuit, “special
interrogatories related to [the qualified immunity] defense [are] not improper
per se,”222 but they must be carefully crafted so that “[t]he fact-finder’s role is
limited to determining whether the underlying facts are as the plaintiff has
alleged or proved.”223 I, along with other commentators, view that as the
preferable approach, although still more preferable would be to not call on jurors
to reach any decision regarding qualified immunity.224 The remedial rules the
219 Federal Response to Police Misconduct: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil &
Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 34 (1992) (statement of
J. Jon O. Newman, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit).
220 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978) (“[L]ocal governments,
like every other § 1983 ‘person,’ by the very terms of the statute, may be sued for
constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ . . . .”).
221 See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1982) (rejecting subjective test
in favor of “objective reasonableness” test, explaining that “[j]udicial inquiry into subjective
motivation therefore may entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of numerous
persons, including an official’s professional colleagues”).
222 Lampkins v. Thompson, 337 F.3d 1009, 1014 (8th Cir. 2003).
223 McIntosh v. Weinberger, 810 F.2d 1411, 1431 n.8 (8th Cir. 1987), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Turner v. McIntosh, 487 U.S. 1212 (1988); see also Johnson v. Breeden,
280 F.3d 1308, 1318 (11th Cir. 2002) (“It is important to recognize, however, that a defendant
is entitled to have any evidentiary disputes upon which the qualified immunity defense turns
decided by the jury so that the court can apply the jury’s factual determinations to the law and
enter a post-trial decision on the defense.”); Peterson v. City of Plymouth, 60 F.3d 469, 476
(8th Cir. 1995) (granting new trial where district court submitted qualified immunity issue to
jury and stating “the role of the jury in the new trial should be limited to determining what the
officers knew at the time of the arrest. In light of the jury’s findings, the court should then
determine the legal questions of probable cause and qualified immunity”); Warren v. Dwyer,
906 F.2d 70, 76 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that jury should decide any unresolved factual dispute,
but “[t]he ultimate legal determination whether, on the facts found, a reasonable police officer
should have known he acted unlawfully is a question of law better left for the court to decide”).
224 See Karen Blum, Qualified Immunity in the Fourth Amendment: A Practical
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Supreme Court crafted to guide judicial management during motions to dismiss
or motions for summary judgment do not and should not provide rules of
decision for adjudicating constitutional rights in § 1983 trials for damages.
D.

Treating Floors as Ceilings

This Article examines the use of constitutional doctrine in procedural or
institutional contexts which it was not intended to regulate. In other words, it
examines the transformation of constitutional doctrine intended to provide a
floor or bare minimum protection into a ceiling beyond which actors do not
provide further protection. This problem is particularly troubling when it results
in underenforcement of rights by citing to federal constitutional law.
In some contexts, however, what is a floor and what is a ceiling may be
contested and may be unclear from Supreme Court decisions. In the equal
protection context, the Court has developed a series of holdings forbidding not
only certain forms of race discrimination and classifications but also some types
of affirmative action.225 As a result, when states have enacted bars on affirmative
action in higher education (which nine states have done),226 there is a real
question as to whether they have raised the constitutional floor, lowered the
constitutional ceiling, or acted consistently with or contrary to Supreme Court
guidance.227 It is challenging to say whether such statutes are misplaced uses of
Application of § 1983 as It Applies to Fourth Amendment Excessive Force Cases, 21 TOURO
L. REV. 571, 595-96 (2005) (agreeing with Eighth Circuit opinion that court may “rely upon
the factual findings of the jury to decide the issue of qualified immunity,” but jury may not
decide question of qualified immunity itself); Catherine T. Struve, Constitutional Decision
Rules for Juries, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 659, 681-82 (2006) (“Admittedly, in order to
dispose of the case without trial, the judge must ask whether any reasonable jury could find
for the non-moving party. But this does not mean that the decision rule employed by the judge
must be worded in the same way as the decision rule for a jury.” (footnote omitted)).
225 See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (holding that strict scrutiny
requires more careful approach than point-based affirmative action system); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332-33 (2003) (finding that affirmative action program that
considered race of applicant among many other variables satisfied strict scrutiny); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (holding that strict scrutiny applies
to uses of affirmative action in employment); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 289-90 (1978) (plurality opinion) (holding that use of quotas in higher education violates
Equal Protection Clause).
226 Dominique J. Baker, Why Might States Ban Affirmative Action?, BROOKINGS (Apr. 12,
2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brown-center-chalkboard/2019/04/12/why-mightstates-ban-affirmative-action/ [https://perma.cc/NA3V-LDX8] (presenting research on nine
states that have ever banned affirmative action, of which one state’s ban was ultimately
reversed).
227 See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights &
Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 572 U.S. 291, 298-315 (2014) (assessing
whether amendment to the Constitution of Michigan prohibiting state and other governmental
entities in Michigan from granting race-based preferences in wide range of actions and
decisions was constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
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constitutional rulings from the Court, which has restricted some, but certainly
not all, uses of affirmative action. If the Court had clearly stated that some
affirmative action was protected—or even required—to remedy historical
discrimination, then those statutes would raise constitutional questions. It is not
clear whether they are building on constitutional norms (forbidding some uses
of affirmative action) or undermining constitutional norms (remedying current
and historical discrimination). The lack of clarity is due to the contested state of
the Supreme Court’s doctrine; in its ruling in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend
Affirmative Action,228 the Court held that such statutes are constitutional
expressions of voter preferences.229
Where it is clear that constitutional rights do not apply in a setting, and yet
they are applied in a manner that reduces protection, it might very well be the
case that state and local actors will continue to underenforce without reference
to the federal model. The account here is not causal. However, federal
constitutional law may provide added justification for underenforcement, and I
argue here that is likely why it is being relied upon in these contexts. One could
also imagine that state and local actors might borrow federal standards to justify
enforcement that is broader and extends beyond the constitutional floor. They
might similarly be citing to the Constitution to justify increasing protection
without having to fully provide the justification for doing so under state law.
Doing so may not risk the same underprotection of rights, but it raises similar
legitimacy concerns in which a state or locality is not making a deliberate policy
and law choice independently.
CONCLUSION
In a range of important and unrelated areas of constitutional law—and
sometimes despite the Supreme Court’s cautionary language—constitutional
rules have taken hold outside of the administrative and procedural settings that
they were primarily designed to regulate. What results is unanticipated and
misplaced changes to rules and practice. This Article has described judicial
decisions that profess not to alter an area of law but have had that very effect
and how such decisions have had the effect of undermining (or augmenting) the
very constitutional protections that they sought to create. Rulings by the Court
designed to protect or elaborate the underlying constitutional right have done
more: they have become part of the instructions given to a jury when weighing
evidence in a case, affected rules for admissibility of expert evidence, and
governed decisions regarding whether to prosecute police officers, among other
things. In doing so, judicial and executive actors have eroded rights by
overextending them to the wrong government actors or by using them in
unintended procedural or remedial contexts.
The problem of misplaced constitutional law should be addressed far more
carefully by judges and other legal actors. The Supreme Court should step in to
correct unintentional misuses of constitutional doctrine in lower courts. As

228
229

572 U.S. 291 (2014).
Id. at 313-15.
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noted, the Court has done so in some contexts, trying to keep certain types of
constitutional rulings confined to civil suits for damages, pretrial remedies in
criminal cases, or post-conviction relief. That type of border control, however,
is selective, perhaps sometimes reflecting the selective attention of the Justices.
Further, some of these misplacements have occurred in areas—such as jury
instructions and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion—that are not readily
challenged in litigation. They have gone unnoticed and often cannot easily be
remedied.
One overarching theme of this Article is that government actors should be
more explicit and careful when deciding whether a constitutional baseline should
inform decision-making. The Court should examine bare citations to
constitutional standards to assess whether they are in fact applicable. Lower
court judges and executive officials should be careful not to incorporate
constitutional tests in ways that serve different purposes from those they were
intended to serve, as doing so can underprotect rights or prevent government
actors from crafting more protective rules. More clearly addressing the
misplaced use of constitutional rights in new procedural and institutional
contexts can help to prevent unanticipated augmentation—or worse, the
erosion—of constitutional rights.

